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I. INTRODUCTION
A health maintenance organization (HMO) may be defined as
an organization that agrees to provide, directly or by contracts with
* Associate Professor of Law, University of Kansas. B.A., Amherst College, 1963; LL.B.,
Yale University, 1968.
** Member of the staff of the U.S. Senate Committee on Commerce. B.A., University
of Kansas, 1973; J.D., University of Kansas, 1976. The authors are indebted to Joseph Har-
kins, Assistant Professor, University of Kansas Medical Center, for his comments on a draft
of this Article.
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other providers, a specified range of health services to a voluntarily
enrolled population in exchange for prepaid per capita payments.'
The HMO's primary and unique feature is that it is both a health
service provider and a health service insurer.2 As providers with
fixed budgets, HMOs have much stronger incentives to control
health service costs than the fee-for-service providers who dominate
the American medical economy.3 As insurers with relatively close
control over the delivery of insured services, HMOs also should have
greater ability to control costs than traditional health service insur-
ers.' These facts make HMOs a most promising instrument for re-
1. INSTITUTE OF MEDICINE, NATIONAL ACADEMY OF SCIENCES, HEALTH MAINTENANCE OR-
GANIZATIONS: TOWARD A FAIR MARKET TEST 2 (1974) [hereinafter cited as IOM REPORT]. This
broad definition carries several policy implications that should be noted here for more com-
plete understanding of the term. First, the definition includes profit-making as well as non-
profit entities. Secondly, the definition allows for great flexibility in an HMO's organizational
structure. For example, it includes not only prepaid medical group practices with salaried
physicians, but also foundations sponsored by medical societies that reimburse private practi-
tioners on a fee-for-service basis. Thirdly, the definition is not limited by reference to specific
health care services. Under this definition an HMO might provide only prepaid dental care,
prepaid drug services, or prepaid surgical services. Finally, the definition does exclude non-
voluntary enrollees, although prepaid health care practices could be established for nonvol-
untary populations. No one to our knowledge has proposed this, and consumer choice of
HMOs does seem to be an important device for helping guard against the risk of financially
induced underservice by HMOs, id. at 53-54, and for obtaining consumer acceptance of this
relatively new form of medical practice, see id. at 42. Note also that the term "health main-
tenance organization" itself possibly is misleading in its implication that HMOs are likely to
be substantially better than other providers in maintaining the health of patients through
preventive rather than remedial medical care. Id. at 2. A more generic term such as "prepaid
health care practice" would appear to be preferable, but the term HMO has obtained popular
acceptance among health care policymakers and on balance its use appears to reduce rather
than add to semantic confusion. Id.
2. Id. at 3.
3. See Auger & Goldberg, Prepaid Health Plans and Moral Hazard, 22 PUB. POLICY 353
(1974).
4. Traditional health service insurers, Blue Cross, Blue Shield, and commercial car-
riers, typically reimburse providers from whom a subscriber has chosen to obtain service or
indemnify subscribers for fees paid to a provider chosen by the subscriber. See M. ROEMER,
R. HETHERINGTON, C. HOPKINS, A. GERST, E. PARSONS & D. LONG, HEALTH INSURANCE EFFECTS:
SERVICES, EXPENDITURES, AND ATTITUDES 1 (1972) [hereinafter cited as ROEMER]. These ar-
rangements provide insurers with less legal and administrative control over the delivery of
services than may be established by an HMO that contracts in advance with professional and
institutional providers. Admittedly legal controls over providers can be implemented by
establishing conditions for provider reimbursement, but individual insurers may be in a weak
bargaining position vis-a-vis providers to obtain such controls and administration of these
controls can be cumbersome. Moreover, it is the nonprofit Blues that have tended to use the
provider cost reimbursement method, and physicians and hospitals have created and domi-
nated Blue Shield and Blue Cross carriers, respectively. S. LAW, BLUE CROSS WHAT WENT
WRONG? 6-13, 18-30 (2d ed. 1976) [hereinafter cited as LAW]. It is not likely that the Blues
will turn willingly on their creators and attempt to impose stringent cost controls, at least in
health insurance markets where these carriers have established relatively dominant positions.
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forming the health care system,5 although they also raise concern
about the possibility of underservice that results in the denial of
needed care.'
HMOs have existed in this country since 1929.7 They now serve
as the primary health care providers for perhaps as many as ten
million Americans,8 but only in the past decade have the numbers
of HMOs and their subscribers expanded appreciably.9 In this de-
cade policymakers also have developed substantial interest in pro-
moting HMOs as an alternative to fee-for-service medicine, primar-
ily in response to society's cri de coeur over rising health care costs."0
5. See, e.g., S. REP. No. 129, 93d Cong., 1st Sess. 1-17 (1973) (reporting on S. 14, the
Senate version of the Health Maintenance Organization Act of 1973) [hereinafter cited as
SENATE HMO REPORT I]; Havighurst, Health Maintenance Organizations and the Market for
Health Services, 35 LAW & CONTEMP. PROB. 716 (1970) [hereinafter cited as Havighurst,
HMOs]; Holley & Carlson, The Legal Context for the Development of Health Maintenance
Organizations, 24 STAN. L. REV. 644 (1972).
6. See, e.g., IOM REPORT, supra note 1, at 51-61; Havighurst, HMOs, supra note 5, at
754-56.
7. HEALTH SERVICES ADMINISTRATION, U.S. DEP'T OF HEALTH, EDUCATION AND WELFARE,
HEALTH MAINTENANCE ORGANIZATIONS: SUMMARY OF FY 1975 ANNUAL REPORT 1 (1975)
[hereinafter cited as HEW ANNUAL REPORT].
8. See N.Y. Times, May 17, 1976, at 16, col. 5. But cf. note 9 infra.
9. See HEW ANNUAL REPORT, supra note 7, at 5, indicating that from 1965 to 1975 the
number of HMOs in operation increased from about 20 to more than 175 and the number of
HMO enrollees increased from about 1.5 million to 6 million. One national census of HMOs
recorded a growth in the number of operational HMOs from 34 prior to 1970 to 181 as of July
1, 1975. R. WETHERVILLE & J. NORDBY, A CENSUS OF HMOs: JULY 1975, at 8 (1975) (available
from Interstudy, 123 East Grant Street, Minneapolis, Minn. 55403 [hereinafter cited as
HMO CENSUS]. The July 1975 report, however, contains the last HMO census data collected
by Interstudy. Letter from Robert E. Schlenker, Senior Health Economist, Interstudy, to
Philip Kissam, Oct. 3, 1975. This recent expansion is due apparently to favorable market
conditions, including rapidly increasing health care costs and related insurance premiums,
and the expectation of HMO organizers that the federal government will provide subsidies
and other benefits to promote HMO growth. McNeil & Schlenker, HMOs, Competition, and
Government, 53 MILBANK MEM. FUND Q. 195, 195-207 (1975).
10. The current interest of policymakers in HMOs seems to have been initiated in 1967
by the report of a National Advisory Commission on Health Manpower that outlined the
possibility of significant efficiencies for prepaid group practices. See Greenlick, The Impact
of Prepaid Group Practice on American Medical Care: A Critical Evaluation, 399 ANNALS 100,
101-02 (1972). This interest has developed notably as part of the political response to dramati-
cally rising health care costs. See, e.g., 117 CONG. REC. 284 (1971) (speech by Senator Kennedy
to introduce a bill to create a national system of health care); 117 CONG. REC. 3119, 3119-21
(1971) (message of President Nixon to Congress relative to building a national health strat-
egy). Admittedly rising health care costs seem extraordinary and worrisome. Since 1959,
except for the period from August 1971 to April 1974, when mandatory federal price controls
applied to the health sector, both hospital service costs and physician fees have increased at
substantially higher rates than the prices for other consumer services, and during this period
the percentage of GNP devoted to health services increased from 5.2% to 8.3%. PRESIDENT'S
COUNCIL ON WAGE AND PRICE STABILITY, THE PROBLEM OF RISING HEALTH CARE COSTS 5-9, 27
(1976). Some of this spending has been for needed additional services and relatively unique
cost increases, but much of it apparently must be attributed to the peculiarities of health
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New federal" and state12 legislation to promote and regulate HMO
development has been enacted and the literature on HMOs has
flowered.' 3 There remains, however, substantial disagreement about
economics, which include importantly, the widespread availability of third-party payments
for services and the fact that physicians alone often determine the nature and extent of
services. See id. at 9-21.
11. The major federal HMO legislation consists of the Health Maintenance Organiza-
tion Act of 1973, 42 U.S.C. § 300e (Supp. V, 1975), and the 1972 amendments to the Social
Security Act that established conditions for HMO participation in the Medicare program on
a prepaid basis, 42 U.S.C. § 1395mm (Supp. V, 1975), and authorized states to provide health
services to Medicaid enrollees through prepaid contracts with HMOs, 42 U.S.C. § 1396(a)(23)
(Supp. V, 1975). This legislation is discussed in the text accompanying notes 232-459 infra.
12. We analyze state HMO legislation in a second article, Kissam & Johnson, State
HMO Laws and the Theory of Limited Reformmongering (to be published in a forthcoming
issue of the Kansas Law Review). As of June, 1976, at least 25 states had enacted new
legislation that expressly authorizes and regulates the operation of HMOs. See, e.g., ARIz.
REV. STAT. ANN. §§ 20-1051 to -1068 (1975) (enacted 1973); ARK. STAT. ANN. §§ 66-5201 to
-5228 (Supp. 1975) (enacted 1975); CAL. HEALTH & SAFETY CODE §§ 1340-1399.5 (West Supp.
1976) (enacted 1975); COLO. REV. STAT. ANN. §§ 10-17-101 to -129 (1973) (enacted 1973); FLA.
STAT. §§ 641.17-.38 (1972) (enacted 1972); IDAHO CODE §§ 41-3901 to -3931 (Supp. 1975)
(enacted 1974); ILL. ANN. STAT. ch. 111 /2, §§ 1401-17 (Supp. 1976) (enacted 1974); IOWA CODE
ANN. §§ 514B.1-.32 (Supp. 1976) (enacted 1973); KAN. STAT. ANN. §§ 40-3201 to -3226 (Supp.
1975) (enacted 1974); Ky. REV. STAT. ANN. §§ 304.38-010 to -200 (Supp. 1976) (enacted 1974);
ME. REV. STAT. ANN. ch. 56, §§ 4201-26 (Supp. 1976) (enacted 1975); MD. ANN. CODE art. 43,
§§ 840-58 (Supp. 1975) (enacted 1975); MICH. COMp. LAWS ANN. §§ 325.901-.947 (1975) (en-
acted 1974); MINN. STAT. ANN. §§ 62D.01-.29 (Supp. 1976) (enacted 1973); NEV. REV. STAT.
§§ 695C.010-.350 (1975) (enacted 1973); N.J. STAT. ANN. §§ 26:2J-1 to -30 (Supp. 1976)
(enacted 1973); N.D. CENT. CODE §§ 26-38-01 to -35 (Supp. 1975) (enacted 1975); OKLA. STAT.
ANN. tit. 63, §§ 2501-10 (Supp. 1975) (enacted 1975); PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 40, §§ 1551-68 (Supp.
1976) (enacted 1972); S.C. CODE ANN. §§ 37-1131 to -1136 (Supp. 1975) (enacted 1974); S.D.
COMPILED LAWS ANN. §§ 58-41-1 to -97 (Supp. 1976) (enacted 1974); TENN. CODE ANN. §§ 56-
4101 to -4105 (Supp. 1975) (enacted 1971); Tzx. INS. CODE art. 20A.01-.33 (Supp. 1975)
(enacted 1975); UTAH CODE ANN. §§ 31-42-1 to -32 (1974) (enacted 1973); WASH. REV. CODE
ANN. §§ 48. 46.010-.920 (Supp. 1975) (enacted 1975). We have not included New York statutes
concerning prepaid health care services because we are in agreement with others, see Schnei-
der, infra note 13, at 268 n.7, that those statutes are not sufficiently comprehensive to be
considered the equivalent of an HMO act. N.Y. INS. LAW § 250 (McKinney Supp. 1975)
(enacted 1971); N.Y. PuB. HEALTH LAW §§ 4400-23 (McKinney Supp. 1975) (enacted 1971).
For a description of the New York scheme authorizing prepaid practice see Albright & Vest-
ner, Prepaid Health Care Legislation in New York, 36 ALBANY L. REV. 488 (1972).
13. It is practical to provide only a sample of the recent literature on HMOs. Major
works on HMO laws and legislative policy include: IOM REPORT, supra note 1; Havighurst,
HMOs, supra note 5; Havighurst & Bovbjerg, Professional Standards Review Organizations
and Health Maintenance Organizations: Are They Compatible?, 1975 UTAH L. REv. 381;
Holley & Carlson, supra note 5; McNeil & Schlenker, supra note 9; Rosoff, Phase Two of the
Federal HMO Development Program: New Directions After a Shaky Start, 1 AM. J.L. & MED.
209 (1975); Schneider, Model Consumer Health Maintenance Organization Act and
Commentary, 6 RUTGERS-CAMDEN L.J. 265 (1974); Schneider & Stem, Health Maintenance
Organizations and the Poor: Problems and Prospects, 70 Nw. U.L. REv. 90 (1975); Note, The
Role of Prepaid Group Practice in Relieving the Medical Care Crisis, 84 HARV. L. REV. 887
(1971) [hereinafter cited as Harvard HMO Note]. Two recent articles have reviewed medical
and economic studies of HMO performance: Donabedian, An Evaluation of Prepaid Group
Practice, 6 INQUIRY, Sept. 1969, at 3; Roemer & Shonick, HMO Performance: The Recent
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the appropriate role of HMOs in health care policymaking.'4
The purpose of this Article is twofold. First, we develop a theory
for HMO legislation based on an assessment of past experience with
HMOs, current problems with the delivery of health services, and
different legislative theories that have been advanced by others.
Secondly, we use this theory to help evaluate some major issues
faced by legislators and administrators in regulating HMOs and to
suggest a number of improvements. A recurring theme throughout
this analysis is that policymakers have not considered fully all of the
economic and political ramifications of the HMO phenomenon.
This has helped produce theoretical conflict about HMO policy and
legislation that is incomplete and often muddled.
The first part of this Article summarizes the literature on the
empirical performance and theory of HMOs. The second part ana-
lyzes legislative theories about HMOs that have been advanced by
others and proposes a new one, which borrows from previous theo-
ries and to some extent synthesizes them. The third part analyzes
federal HMO legislation in the context of this theory, and certain
legislative changes are proposed.
H. HMO PERFORMANCE AND THEORY
The major points made about HMOs in the existing literature'
may be divided into four categories: (1) the favorable economic
performance of HMOs in contrast to the fee-for-service sector; (2)
certain quality of care advantages of HMOs; (3) the favorable com-
petitive stimulus that HMOs may provide to other providers and
insurers; and (4) certain risks that HMOs will provide care of infe-
rior quality, in particular the risk of underservice. A review of these
points seems advisable because resolution of several important leg-
islative issues depends in part on one's conception of the fundamen-
tal nature of HMOs.
A. Favorable Economic Performance
Available empirical studies suggest consistently that consum-
ers may obtain health services from HMOs at a lower total cost
Evidence, 51 MILBANK MEM. FUND Q. 271 (1973). Another recent study has reviewed much of
the economic theory and performance of HMOs. See Auger & Goldberg, supra note 3.
14. See, e.g., IOM REPORT, supra note 1, at 1; Havighurst & Bovbjerg, supra note 13,
at 386-87.
15. The following discussion is based largely on the following sources: ROEMER, supra
note 4; Auger & Goldberg, supra note 3; Donabedian, supra note 13; Havighurst, HMOs,
supra note 5, at 720-24; Holley & Carlson, supra note 5, at 649-53; Roemer & Shonick, supra
note 13; Harvard HMO Note, supra note 13, at 921-33.
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(insurance premium and out-of-pocket expenditures) than they can
obtain similar services from fee-for-service providers when consum-
ers are covered by traditional health insurance plans.'" The HMOs
studied have achieved savings for consumers ranging from about ten
percent to thirty percent of the total costs of providing medical
care." These savings for HMO subscribers have been realized
through substantially lower out-of-pocket expenditures rather than
reduced premiums, which tend to be higher than premiums charged
by other health insurers."8 HMO premiums tend to be higher be-
cause HMO policies generally cover more services than other poli-
cies, particularly more ambulatory services, and require fewer de-
ductibles and coinsurance payments by subscribers.'9 These sav-
ings, moreover, have occurred even though the more comprehensive
HMO coverage invites more frequent consumer demands for service,
and even though HMO subscribers tend to have a higher overall risk
of illness and thus need care more frequently than subscribers to
other plans.20 The primary sources of HMO cost savings appear to
be reduced hospital utilization and, to a lesser extent, reduced sur-
gery and reduced drug costs. 2' The reduction in drug costs can be
substantial,2 2 but many HMOs do not offer full coverage of drug
16. See ROEMER, supra note 4, at 3-8 (reviewing prior comparative studies), 43-49 (cost
findings of the reported study); Donabedian, supra note 13, at 16-17; Roemer & Shonick,
supra note 13, at 294-95. The term "traditional health insurance" will be used herein to
denote insurance plans that reimburse providers for costs or indemnify subscribers for fees
paid. See note 4 supra.
17. ROEMER, supra note 4, at 46 (reporting total expenditures of HMO subscribers to
be 11% less than total expenditures of subscribers in commercial health insurance plans and
total expenditures of HMO subscribers to be 28% less than total expenditures of subscribers
in Blue Cross-Blue Shield plans); Donabedian, supra note 13, at 16 Table 5 (summarizing
the cost data from four different comparative studies). See also REPORT OF THE NATIONAL
ADVISORY COMMISSION ON HEALTH MANPOWER 207 (1967) [hereinafter cited as COMM'N
REPORT] (estimating 20-30% savings for members of the Kaiser Permanente Plan HMO);
Harvard HMO Note, supra note 13, at 922 (reporting 33% savings for members of the Group
Health Cooperative of Puget Sound HMO).
18. See, e.g., ROEMER, supra note 4, at 46.
19. See Harvard HMO Note, supra note 13, at 905-06. The reasons for more comprehen-
sive coverage by HMOs have not been made entirely clear, but presumably it results from
an amalgam of sponsor's philosophies, consumers' market preferences, and the attractiveness
to participating physicians of being able to provide a full range of services without worrying
about substantial out-of-pocket expenditures for patients. See, e.g., Phelan, Erickson &
Fleming, Group Practice Prepayment: An Approach to Delivering Organized Health Services,
35 LAW & CONTEMP. PROB. 796, 800-02 (1970) [hereinafter cited as Phelan]; Harvard HMO
Note, supra note 13.
20. See ROEMER, supra note 4, at 14-17. HMOs' more comprehensive insurance coverage
is one reason why HMOs will tend to attract higher risk individuals. Id. at 47.
21. See Auger & Goldberg, supra note 3, at 383-87; Donabedian, supra note 13, at 13-
16, 19-20; Roemer & Shonick, supra note 13, at 281-85.
22. McCaffree & Newman, Prepayment of Drug Costs Under a Group Practice Prepay-
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services, particularly outpatient drugs, 23 apparently because of the
perceived marketing need to maintain a competitive balance be-
tween their relatively high premiums and those of other insurers.24
The conclusion that HMOs are substantially more efficient
than other providers is subject to several qualifications. First, exist-
ing studies have focused on the experience of a few relatively well-
established HMOs, such as the Kaiser Permanente Plan 2 and the
Health Insurance Plan of Greater New York.26 New HMOs may not
be as successful as existing ones in attracting competent physicians,
skilled administrators, and capital resources that are necessary for
efficient performance.2 1 Secondly, existing studies also have focused
primarily on only one of two basic HMO types, the so-called
"closed-panel" HMO that reimburses its physicians on a salaried or
capitation basis. The other type, the medical care foundation
(MCF), reimburses its participating physicians on a fee-for-service
basis, although such fees are subject to the total prepayments col-
lected from subscribers. 28 The MCF is of newer vintage than the
ment Plan, 58 AM. J. PUB. HEALTH 1212 (1968), found a cost savings in one HMO's outpatient
prescription drug program of 45% compared to nationwide outpatient drug costs, which figure
they adjusted downward to 28% to account for taxes paid and profits of retail pharmacies
and drugs purchased outside the plan by the HMO's subscribers. They explain this dramatic
difference by pointing to the HMO's use of a drug formulary that includes prices, its adminis-
trative controls over prescriptions including drug utilization reviews, and economies of size
of the particular HMO (which had 95,000 members). See also Johnson, Present and Projected
Drug System Services in a Highly Developed HMO Structure, 88 HEALTH SERv. REP. 873
(1973).
23. Johnson, supra note 22, at 874; Harvard HMO Note, supra note 13, at 905-06.
24. Havighurst, HMOs, supra note 5, at 779-80.
25. The Kaiser Permanente Plan today operates HMOs in 5 states, California, Colo-
rado, Ohio, Oregon, and Hawaii, and serves more than 2 million subscribers. Phelan, supra
note 19, at 807-08. It is clearly the predominant HMO organization in the country, and it
has figured prominently in many of the comparative empirical studies. See ROEMER, supra
note 4, at 5-10; Donabedian, supra note 13, at 16-17.
26. The Health Insurance Plan of Greater New York serves something less than a
million subscribers in the metropolitan New York area and is the second largest HMO organi-
zation in the country. Phelan, supra note 19, at 806. This HMO also has figured prominently
in many of the oomparative empirical studies. See ROEMER, supra note 4, at 3-4; Donabedian,
supra note 13, at 16-17.
27. Harvard HMO Note, supra note 13, at 946-54.
28. The two basic types of HMOs are described and labelled as "closed-panel" and
"medical care foundation" by Auger & Goldberg, supra note 3, at 358-63. These terms will
be used herein, although the term "closed-panel" carries the somewhat misleading implica-
tion that the MCF is "open-panel," i.e., an insurance plan that covers services obtained from
any qualified physician. The critical difference between the two HMO types lies with their
different mechanisms for reimbursing participating physicians as described in the text. See
generally Egdahl, Foundations for Medical Care, 288 NEw ENG. J. MED. 491 (1973). MCFs
have been sponsored by county medical societies and are open for participation by all physi-
cian members of the county society who agree to accept various controls over their practice
(including maximum fees, claims and peer review, and certain risk-sharing). See Auger &
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closed-panel HMO, 21 and results of the few studies of MCFs' cost
effectiveness appear to be less than conclusive." This may be in
good part because MCFs continue to provide fee-for-service reim-
bursement to individual physicians and thus do not fully reverse the
financial incentives of participating physicians.3' A third qualifica-
tion is that existing studies have assessed the relative quality of
HMO and fee-for-service performance only in limited ways, primar-
ily by comparative analyses of medical procedures and patient atti-
tudes.3 2 The studies indicate that the quality of HMO services has
been at least equivalent to the quality of services furnished under
traditional insurance plans, 33 but one cannot be certain that HMOs'
cost savings are not achieved at the expense of quality as measured
by health outcomes. Finally, HMOs' relative efficiency may not
reduce the total costs of medical expenditures for all groups. For
example, the aged and the poor apparently have received relatively
little service from the HMOs considered in existing studies .3 These
groups commonly are thought to have a relatively high risk of dis-
ease,3 5 and they may demand substantially increased services if pro-
Goldberg, supra note 3, at 358-63; Egdahl, supra, at 491-93. As a result, the MCF subscriber
is provided with more of an "open" choice of physicians than subscribers to closed-panel
HMOs, but the former subscriber still is insured only for services obtained from physicians
who agree to participate in the MCF.
29. The first MCF was formed in San Joaquin County, California, in 1954. Egdahl,
supra note 28, at 491.
30. See Roemer & Shonick, supra note 13, at 294-95. But cf. Auger & Goldberg, supra
note 3, at 383-84; Egdahl, supra note 30, at 493-94.
31. Auger & Goldberg, supra note 3, at 378-80.
32. See ROEMER, supra note 4, at 41-42, 50-58; Donabedian, supra note 13, at 7-10, 20-
24; Roemer & Shonick, supra note 13, at 304-09. The ideal, but rarely available, measure of
quality is of course an assessment of health outcomes, i.e., how healthy are HMO subscribers
compared with others? Roemer & Shonick, supra note 13, at 302. There have been a few
studies comparing health outcomes of HMO subscribers and other groups, but apparently
none of these studies have compared the relative costs of service. See Donabedian, supra note
13, at 23-24.
33. See ROEMER, supra note 4, at 41-42, 50-58; Donabedian, supra note 13, at 7-10, 20-
24; Roemer & Shonick, supra note 13, at 291-93, 302-09.
34. See COMM'N REPORT, supra note 17, at 207 (reporting that "indigents and old per-
sons are underrepresented" in the Kaiser Permanente Plan compared to California's popula-
tion); Greenlick, supra note 10, at 108-09 (reporting similar findings for other early HMOs,
including the Health Insurance Plan of Greater New York); cf. Schneider & Stern, supra note
13, at 98-101, 111-12; Harvard HMO Note, supra note 13, at 934-36.
35. See, e.g., ROEMER, supra note 4, at 14 (a higher risk of disease is associated with
age); Schneider & Stem, supra note 13, at 99 (a higher risk of disease is associated with
poverty). But see AMERICAN ENTERPRISE INSTITUTE, NATIONAL HEALTH INSURANCE PROPOSALS:
LEGIsLATIvE ANALYSIS No. 19, at 9 (1974) [hereinafter cited as AEI ANALYSIS], which suggests
that, except for infant mortality, there may be no differentials in health status based upon
income.
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vided with more comprehensive insurance."
The most persuasive theoretical explanation for HMOs' rela-
tive efficiency appears to be simply that their reversed financial
incentives encourage provision of less costly care.37 In fee-for-
service medicine there are inherent incentives for physicians and
hospitals to increase their incomes by providing unnecessary serv-
ices, and, perhaps more significantly, by providing services of the
highest possible quality without considering whether the extra bene-
fits obtained are commensurate with the extra costs 8 These incen-
tives are likely to be particularly strong when health insurance re-
duces the patient's out-of-pocket costs, which reduces the ethical
constraint on the provider to consider the immediate financial bur-
den to the patient.3 9 With the reversal of economic incentives,
HMOs in theory should seek to reduce costs by introducing a rela-
tively large number of changes in traditional patterns of medical
practice." One would expect, for example, that HMOs would at-
tempt to institute more effective controls over physician access to
hospital beds by limiting the bed supply and instituting procedures
such as second consultations and intensive physician peer review to
eliminate unnecessary and unnecessarily long inpatient stays."
Similarly, one would expect HMOs to make more frequent use of
less costly generic drugs, at least when HMO policies cover drugs;42
to arrange for more efficient delegation of medical acts by physi-
cians to nonphysicians; 3 and to question physicians' adherence to
routine practices, such as the ordering of X-rays and laboratory
tests, simply to maximize quality of care or minimize perceived
risks of malpractice liability.44
Existing HMOs appear to have implemented some but by no
means all of these expected changes. On the one hand, closed-panel
HMOs have reduced substantially hospital utilization by patients
36. See Harvard HMO Note, supra note 13, at 934-35. But see ROEMER, supra note 4,
at 7-8.
37. See Auger & Goldberg, supra note 3, at 354-58; Roemer & Shonick, supra note 13,
at 301-02.
38. Auger & Goldberg, supra note 3, at 372; Havighurst, HMOs, supra note 5, at 720-
22. See generally Havighurst & Blumstein, Coping With Quality/Cost Trade-Offs in Medical
Care: The Role of PSROs, 70 Nw. U.L. REv. 6, 9-28 (1975).
39. Auger & Goldberg, supra note 3, at 372.
40. Havighurst, HMOs, supra note 5, at 720-22.
41. See generally Roemer & Shonick, supra note 13, at 281-88.
42. Havighurst, HMOs, supra note 5, at 721, 779-80; see Donabedian, supra note 13, at
19-20.
43. See Roemer & Shonick, supra note 13, at 297.
44. Havighurst, HMOs, supra note 5, at 720-22.
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without apparent sacrifice in the quality of care." Major reasons for
reduced hospital utilization appear to be the ability of closed-panel
HMOs to limit their hospital bed-to-population ratios, and the lack
of financial incentive of salaried physicians compared with other
physicians to prescribe inpatient surgery that is more remunerative
than outpatient surgery or no surgery at all." On the other hand,
MCF-type HMOs in one available study did not experience any
decline in hospital utilization, and the fee-for-service reimburse-
ment of MCF physicians would appear to be a major obstacle to any
such reduction by MCFs.47 Furthermore, many HMO policies may
not cover drug costs because of the need to maintain a competitive
balance between HMO premiums and those of other insurers. 8 Ex-
clusion of this coverage eliminates much of the incentive for HMOs
to reduce patients' drug costs. 9 Finally, there seems to be little
evidence that HMOs have implemented expanded delegation of
medical acts or other innovative cost-reducing medical practices
that relate most intimately to individual physician decisionmak-
ingY' One important explanation for this failure may be the fear of
HMOs that innovative and cost-effective practices may cause impo-
sition of additional malpractice liability if the customary standard
of professional practice for fee-for-service providers is applied to
HMOs. 51 Other considerations undoubtedly are the traditional em-
phasis of individual physicians on providing the highest quality of
care possible without consideration of costs52 and understandable
physician resistance and feared consumer resistance to dramatic
departures in existing direct care practices. The failure of HMOs to
expand medical delegation aggressively appears to be particularly
unfortunate in view of substantial opportunities for cost savings
45. Roemer & Shonick, supra note 13, at 281-88.
46. Id. at 287-88.
47. Id. at 285-86.
48. See text accompanying notes 24-26 supra.
49. Havighurst, HMOs, supra note 5, at 779-80; HMOs might still advertise that they
generally prescribe less costly generic drugs (which patients pay for directly) in an effort to
obtain subscribers, but this would seem to be a weaker incentive for cost reduction than if
drug cost savings accrued directly to HMOs.
50. See COMM'N REPORT, supra note 17, at 215-16; Roemer & Shonick, supra note 13,
at 295-302. But cf. Lairson, Record & James, Physician Assistants at Kaiser: Distinctive
Patterns of Practice, 11 INQUIRY, Sept. 1974, at 207 [hereinafter cited as Lairson].
51. See Bovbjerg, The Medical Malpractice Standard of Care: HMOs and Customary
Practice, 1975 DuKE L.J. 1375, who suggests, reasonably we believe, that malpractice law
should develop separate customary standards to apply to HMOs and fee-for-service providers
in order to take account of HMOs' interest in making cost effective decisions.
52. See Havighurst & Blumstein, supra note 38, at 20-28.
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offered by feasible expanded delegation53 and the existence of
conditions, at least in closed-panel HMOs, that appear conducive
for such delegation." In addition to the general explanations for this
failure given above, the typical structure of state medical practice
laws raises significant questions about the legality of much ex-
panded delegation. 5 Although most states recently have enacted
"physician's assistant" and "nurse practitioner" laws to promote
and regulate expanded delegation, by and large these laws seem
incomplete and overly restrictive. 6 For example, they tend to limit
unduly or leave unresolved the scope of authorized expanded dele-
gations," and they tend to limit eligible nonphysicians to persons
with relatively comprehensive training58 who have received approval
from state licensing boards that are dominated by organized medi-
cine and organized nursing.59
Economies of scale and economies of integration have been sug-
gested as additional theoretical explanations of HMOs' relative effi-
ciency.6" These economies in theory are equally available to other
providers, but the HMOs' need for a minimum number of subscri-
bers to effect risk pooling,6 their relatively comprehensive coverage
of services and unitary organization, and their strong incentive to
reduce costs all suggest that HMOs might take particular advantage
53. See Kissam, Physician's Assistant and Nurse Practitioner Laws: A Study of Health
Law Reform, 24 KAN. L. REV. 1, 7-11 (1975). Note that many ideas about expanded medical
delegation are just being recognized as feasible. Moreover, of all innovative medical practices
expanded delegation may have the most visible impact upon the consumer, and thus
substantial physician and consumer fears about its introduction appear likely.
54. These conditions include the feasibility of close supervision of delegated acts by the
physician, a relative lack of concern by him that his income position may be eroded, and, in
the case of larger, self-sufficient HMOs, lessened fear of retaliation by competitors. Roemer
& Shonick, supra note 13, at 297.
55. Kissam, supra note 53, at 11-13.
56. See id. at 1, 29-59.
57. Id. at 44-51. See Lairson, supra note 50, at 207, 216.
58. Kissam, supra note 53, at 37-43.
59. Id. at 52-55.
60. See, e.g., Auger & Goldberg, supra note 3, at 354-58; Holley & Carlson, supra note
5, at 649-50; Roemer & Shonick, supra note 13, at 295-302.
61. Auger & Goldberg, supra note 3, at 357, report that "[i]ndustry sources indicate
that a scale of about 5,000 customers (which would call for about 3 to 5 primary physicians)
is sufficient for achieving the economies of risk pooling." Such a minimum scale of operations,
while considerable, is not nearly as substantial as some have thought previously. See, e.g.,
Ellwood, Restructuring the Health Delivery System-Will the Health Maintenance Strategy
Work, in UNIVERSITY OF CHICAGO CENTER FOR HEALTH ADMINISTRATION STUDIES, HEALTH MAIN-
TENANCE ORGANIZATIONS: A RECONFIGURATION OF THE HEALTH SERVICES SYSTEM 2, 4 (1971),
stating that "[als a general rule-of-thumb, the minimum feasible size of such organizations
is about 20,000 enrollees, and if the HMO owns or controls its own hospital, minimum
enrollment is probably closer to 50,000 or, better still, 100,000."
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of these economies. Scale economies might be realized by better
management controls over physician practices and by more efficient
use of medical paraprofessionals and other ancillary personnel.2
Scale economies for hospital services (when hospitals are operated
by HMOs) might be realized in investment, purchasing, and admin-
istration.6 3 Integration economies might occur because HMOs are
often in a position to coordinate such related services as ambulatory
and inpatient services, surgeons and operating rooms, and primary
and specialist physician services." Although the theoretical hy-
potheses that HMOs can achieve greater economies of scale and
integration than the fee-for-service sector seem attractive, available
empirical studies have neither demonstrated nor contradicted these
claims. 5 It thus would seem unwise to design legislation in a manner
that favors development of relatively large HMOs as a means of
ensuring more efficient HMO performance.6
The more comprehensive coverage of services under HMO poli-
cies, in particular broader coverage of ambulatory services, 7 has
been suggested as another cause of HMOs' relative efficiency. 8
Broader insurance coverage of ambulatory services reduces the in-
centive on both patients and physicians to hospitalize simply in
order to obtain insurance benefits.69 Elimination of this perverse
incentive might in theory reduce the total costs of patients' medical
care. Empirical studies, however, have shown that increased ambu-
latory insurance benefits per se have increased rather than de-
creased hospital utilization rates,7" presumably because broader
ambulatory coverage encourages and results in detection of addi-
tional needs for inpatient care. Again, it would appear unwise to
design legislation to require comprehensive service coverage by
HMOs as a means of ensuring more efficient HMO performance.7
62. Roemer & Shonick, supra note 13, at 296-97. The example given by these commen-
tators is that of better control over the pacing of physician visits by individual patients.
63. See COMM'N REPORT, supra note 17, at 216.
64. Holley & Carlson, supra note 5, at 649.
65. See Auger & Goldberg, supra note 3, at 358; Roemer & Shonick, supra note 13, at
301; cf. COMM'N REPORT, supra note 17, at 216, concluding that economies of scale that may
be associated with the large group practices of the Kaiser Permanente Plan do not appear to
be a "major explanatory factor" of Kaiser's lower costs.
66. For a discussion of legislation that has been designed to favor relatively large
HMOs, see text accompanying notes 429-38 infra.
67. See note 19 supra and accompanying text.
68. See, e.g., SENATE HMO REPORT I, supra note 5, at 10; Harvard HMO Note, supra
note 13, at 923-24.
69. Harvard HMO Note, supra note 13, at 923-24.
70. Roemer & Shonick, supra note 13, at 283-84, 286.
71. For a discussion of legislation that requires very comprehensive service coverage by
HMOs for both cost and quality reasons, see text accompanying notes 254-69 infra.
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B. Quality of Care Benefits
The distinct feature of HMOs, prepayment to a provider, sug-
gests several reasons why HMOs generally might offer higher qual-
ity care than that which prevails in fee-for-service medicine. First,
HMOs have a strong incentive to reduce unnecessary medical serv-
ices and some of these services, such as unnecessary surgery72 and
unnecessary drug prescriptions, 73 may be quite harmful to patients.
Although the extent of harmful, unnecessary medical care is cer-
tainly subject to debate,7 HMOs have shown an ability to reduce
the amount of surgery and cost of drugs75 that they provide to pa-
tients without apparent decline in the overall quality of care. These
facts suggest that HMOs may improve substantially the quality of
medical care by reducing delivery of unnecessary but harmful serv-
ices.76
Secondly, HMOs are likely to develop relatively strong utiliza-
tion controls in order to resolve conflicts between the institutional
goal of low-cost service and personal goals of individual physicians
that tend to increase organizational costs. 77 Internal utilization con-
trols will require much review of physician work by other physi-
72. For a recent survey of the kinds and estimated amounts of harmful, unnecessary
surgery believed to occur in this country see N.Y. Times, Jan. 27, 1976, at 1, col. 6. Much of
the recent literature on the possible extent of unnecessary surgery in the United States is cited
in HOUSE SUBCOMM. ON OVERSIGHT AND INVESTIGATIONS, COST AND QUALITY OF HEALTH CARE:
UNNECESSARY SURGERY 2 (1976) [hereinafter cited as HOUSE UNNECESSARY SURGERY REPORT].
73. For a survey of the kinds and estimated amounts of harmful, unnecessary drug
prescriptions believed to occur in this country see N.Y. Times, Jan. 28, 1976, at 1, col. 7.
Among other things, this article reports an estimate by one researcher that, based on pub-
lished data, antibiotics prescribed in hospitals are unnecessary in 22% of all cases. Id. at 17,
col. 1. It also reports on a confidential survey by the drug industry showing that in 1973
perhaps more than 7 million Americans suffering merely from a common cold obtained drug
prescriptions; in more than half of these cases the prescriptions were for antibiotics that are
ineffective for common colds and often have serious side effects. Id. at 17, cols. 4-5. See also
N.Y. Times, April 8, 1976, at 24, col. 3, reporting on a federally funded study in Pennsylvania
hospitals, which found that 20% of the antibiotic drugs prescribed may not be justified by
present scientific evidence.
74. See Lasagna, Medical-News Report, N.Y. Times, May 6, 1976, at 37, col. 7; N.Y.
Times, Feb. 6, 1976, at 1, col. 1.
75. HOUSE UNNECESSARY SURGERY REPORT, supra note 72, at 15; see notes 21-24 supra
and accompanying text.
76. See HOUSE UNNECESSARY SURGERY REPORT, supra note 72, at 6-7; N.Y. Times, Jan.
27, 1976, at 24, col. 5.
77. Auger & Goldberg, supra note 3, at 378-82. This goal conflict between MCFs and
their physicians is described in the text accompanying notes 28-31 supra. A similar conflict
for closed-panel HMOs may exist because salaried physicians or even profit-sharing physi-
cians can have personal goals, such as the desire to work less, to upgrade equipment, or to
follow extra cautious procedures, that are also cost inducing. Auger & Goldberg, supra note
3, at 378-79.
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cians.18 If utilization review is implemented by HMOs, it seems
likely that it would expand naturally into a review of quality with
possible improvement in the quality of care rendered." Thirdly,
HMO physicians, particularly salaried or profit-sharing physicians
of closed-panel HMOs, should have little incentive to refrain from
engaging in referrals and consultations, in contrast to fee-for-service
physicians who tend to lose income when recommending referrals or
obtaining consultations .8 This feature of HMO practice also may be
expected to improve the quality of care, although it has not yet been
subjected to empirical comparison with the fee-for-service sector8 '
Fourthly, it has been argued that, "[t]he fixed price concept
for comprehensive services provides a strong financial incentive...
to place greater emphasis on preventive services to avoid the need
for costly, intensive care which can reduce HMO [sic] income."8
There is some evidence that existing HMOs do provide more pre-
ventive care than fee-for-service providers. 3 It should be noted,
however, that HMOs' financial incentive to provide preventive care
exists only to the extent that early detection and treatment of dis-
ease can avoid more costly subsequent care, 84 and empirical evi-
dence of the existence of cost-effective preventive care appears to be
lacking.8 s It also should be noted that increased preventive care may
not improve the health status of recipients. For example, serious
questions may be raised about whether periodic health examina-
78. Id. at 380-82. On the infrequent nature of physician peer review in existing group
practices, whether pre-paid or not, see Roemer & Shonick, supra note 13, at 292.
79. For discussion of how another form of physician peer review designed primarily to
control medical costs seems likely to focus on quality improvements as well (perhaps too
much so), see Havighurst & Blumstein, supra note 38, at 38-68. Formal physician peer review
programs have produced dramatic increases in the quality of care in particular instances, but
apparently there have been few controlled studies of how effective professional review activi-
ties in general are, and what features enhance or restrict this effectiveness. Donabedian,
Promoting Quality Through Evaluating the Process of Patient Care, 6 MED. CARE 181, 191
(1968). Moreover, information concerning the costs of professional review activities is frag-
mentary, and therefore the cost effectiveness of much peer review is indeterminate. AMERICAN
PUBLIC HEALTH Ass'N, A GUIDE TO MEDICAL CARE ADMINISTRATION-VOL. I: MEDICAL CARE
APPRAISAL 121-22 (1969).
80. See Havighurst, HMOs, supra note 5, at 721-22; Harvard HMO Note, supra note
13, at 928-29.
81. See Roemer & Shonick, supra note 13, at 292.
82. SENATE HMO REPORT I, supra note 5, at 2.
83. See ROEMER, supra note 4, at 41; Roemer & Shonick, supra note 13, at 293.
84. Havighurst, HMOs, supra note 5, at 721. Professor Havighurst also notes that
implementation of cost-effective preventive care assumes a "long-range perspective" on the
part of providers. Uncertainty about pay-offs from such care and a tendency to short-run
conservatism will discourage HMOs from providing even cost-effective preventive care. Id.
at 755 n.104.
85. See Holley & Carlson, supra note 3, at 651-52, particularly n.37.
1176 [Vol. 29:1163
HEALTH MAINTENANCE ORGANIZATIONS
tions for adults improve their health or increase their longevity. s6 On
the other hand, the provision of substantial prenatal and postnatal
care for mother and infant (much of which is preventive care) is
associated strongly with reduced infant mortality,17 and one study
suggests that HMO maternal care, with its emphasis on preventive
care, will tend to reduce infant mortality rates.8 Evidence also sug-
gests that increased well-child care, including parental education in
child care, can improve the health status of children.89
HMOs also may provide better quality care than fee-for-service
providers as a consequence of other relatively unique characteris-
tics. HMOs provide more comprehensive insurance coverage than
traditional health insurance plans,9" and closed-panel HMOs tend
to provide services through integrated physician groups and facili-
ties." Relatively comprehensive coverage of services should make it
easier for consumers to gain access to the entire range of available
medical services. HMO subscribers generally incur lower out-of-
pocket expenditures for obtaining care, and they seek care from a
single source that is able to provide responsible guidance to the most
appropriate service. 2 Furthermore, the care provided may be more
"continuous" then "episodic" and result in more efficient referrals
and use of follow-up procedures to ensure that patients return for
appropriate care." The severe fragmentation of fee-for-service medi-
86. See AEI ANALYSIS, supra note 35, at 10.
87. INSTITUTE OF MEDICINE, NAT'L ACADEMY OF SCIENCES, INFANT DEATH: AN ANALYSIS OF
MATERNAL RISK AND HEALTH CARE 1-3 (1973); Dott & Fort, The Effect of Availability and
Utilization of Prenatal Care and Hospital Services on Infant Mortality Rates, 123 AM. J.
OBSTET. & GYNECOL. 854, 856-58 (1975). One cannot be certain that increased prenatal care
causes reduced infant mortality because a variety of other uncontrolled factors may contrib-
ute to the favorable outcome. Lane & Kelman, Assessment of Maternal Health Care Quality:
Conceptual and Methodologic Issues, 13 MED. CARE 791, 792-93 (1975).
88. See Shapiro, Jacobziner, Densen & Weiner, Further Observations on Prematurity
and Perinatal Mortality in a General Population and in the Population of a Prepaid Group
Practice Medical Care Plan, 50 Am. J. PuB. HEALTH 1304 (1960); Shapiro, Weiner & Densen,
Comparison of Prematurity and Perinatal Mortality in a General Population and in the
Population of a Prepaid Group Practice, Medical Care Plan, 48 AM. J. PUB. HEALTH 170
(1958).
89. AEI ANALYSIS, supra note 35, at 11-12. See also Morris, The Use of the Well-Baby
Clinic to Promote Early Intellectual Development Via Parent Education, 66 AM. J. PUB.
HEALTH 73 (1976).
90. See note 17 supra and accompanying text.
91. Harvard HMO Note, supra note 13, at 903-05.
92. See Havighurst, HMOs, supra note 5, at 722; Holley & Carlson, supra note 5, at
650. For a study suggesting that the health status of elderly persons may be improved by
easier access to HMO care see Shapiro, Williams, Yerby, Densen & Rosner, Patterns of
Medical Use by the Indigent Aged under Two Systems of Medical Care, 57 AM. J. PUB.
HEALTH 784 (1967).
93. Harvard HMO Note, supra note 13, at 931-32.
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cine, and the consequent harm to quality care in terms of access
difficulties and uncoordinated services have been well-documented,
dramatically if not quantitatively.94 Both comprehensive coverage
and physically integrated services also should make it easier, at
least for closed-panel HMOs, to maintain "unitary" or "continu-
ous" medical records for patients. 5 This should help ensure that
providers are informed fully of the patient's clinical history,96 reduce
the possibility that patients needing care will drop out of the sys-
tem,97 and provide additional incentive for physicians to keep care-
ful records.9 8 Finally, the integrated service feature of closed-panel
HMOs also may encourage and support other changes in medical
practice that are believed to improve quality, including group selec-
tion of new physicians, increased time for physicians to undertake
continuing education,99 and more intensive peer review.'
C. Competitive Stimulus to Others
Substantial expansion of HMOs may provide reduced cost and
quality improvement benefits not only for HMO subscribers but for
other health care consumers as well. 101 If HMOs are capable of sub-
stantially reducing consumers' total medical expenditures, other
health insurers, hospitals, and physicians, in order to retain busi-
ness, should be more willing to implement and accept effective con-
trols over utilization and rates and to engage in other cost effective
practices. There is already evidence that other insurers and provi-
ders do respond to economic competition from HMOs, including the
mere threat of competition. MCF-type HMOs, which involve physi-
cian acceptance of increased controls over their practice,'"2 appar-
ently have developed largely in response to closed-panel HMO de-
94. See, e.g., B. EHRENREICH & J. EHRENREICH, THE AMERICAN HEALTH EMPIRE 4-9 (1970);
cf. Harvard HMO Note, supra note 13, at 900.
95. Unitary medical records generally are utilized by closed-panel HMOs. Harvard
HMO Note, supra note 13, at 929.
96. Holley & Carlson, supra note 5, at 650.
97. Harvard HMO Note, supra note 13, at 929.
98. Id. The extra incentive exists because attending physicians will know that other
associated physicians may review the record.
99. Id. at 928. As to the difficulties of evaluating the impact of current continuing
education programs on the quality of care, see Lewis & Hassanein, Continuing Medical
Education-An Epidemiologic Evaluation, 282 NEw ENG. J. MED. 254 (1970). These commen-
tators suggest that effective continuing education programs (and effective evaluation of them)
cannot be developed until medical care largely has been reorganized into group practices,
which can provide physicians time for obtaining continuing education. Id. at 257-59.
100. Harvard HMO Note, supra note 13, at 928. See also note 79 supra.
101. See Havighurst, HMOs, supra note 5, at 743-47.
102. See note 28 supra and accompanying text.
1178 [Vol. 29:1163
HEALTH MAINTENANCE ORGANIZATIONS
velopment in the same or neighboring areas.0 3 Also traditional
health insurers have begun to sponsor a significant number of new
HMOs,"' another apparent response to the competitive threat of
HMOs.
The competitive benefits from substantial HMO expansion
may not be limited to general cost competition among insurers and
providers. Arguably, certain HMO practices will have favorable
demonstration effects upon both consumers and providers in the
fee-for-service sector that encourage the introduction of both quality
improvements and specific efficiencies throughout the medical
economy. For example, as a relatively large number of health care
consumers become exposed and accustomed to such HMO practices
as more comprehensive insurance coverage,' °5 reduced drug utiliza-
tion,' 6 and increased use of paraprofessionals, 07 they may begin to
demand or at least accept more willingly such practices from other
providers. Similarly, physicians may be encouraged to introduce
some of these practices given the example set by their professional
colleagues working for HMOs.
The rebuttal to claims of this nature is that the health care
market has failed and realistically cannot be made to work.' 8 Pro-
fessor Havighurst's answer seems persuasive on this point.' 9 The
health care market has failed in large measure because of the medi-
cal profession's success in repressing market forces such as price
competition and the freedom of physicians to delegate medical func-
tions."' If this is true, effective HMO legislation that frees HMOs
from such constraints may be all that is needed to make the market
work. Moreover, claims of health care market failure often focus
exclusively on the lack of competition between physicians and bar-
103. Egdahl, supra note 28, at 491; Havighurst, HMOs, supra note 5, at 769-70; McNeil
& Schlenker, supra note 9, at 202. This phenomenon of competitive response seems to be
particularly true in California, where much HMO development has taken place. As of July
1, 1975, 70 of 181 operating HMOs in the United States were located in California, and 17 of
34 operating MCF-type HMOs were located there. HMO CENsUS, supra note 9, at 8-10.
Almost all of the MCF development nationwide has occurred since 1972. Id. at 10-11.
104. As of April 1975, the Blues together were sponsors of 17% of all operational HMOs
and other insurance companies were sponsors of an additional 12%. Id. at 14. Most of this
development has occurred since 1970. McNeil & Schlenker, supra note 9, at 202.
105. See text accompanying note 19 supra.
106. See text accompanying notes 21-24 supra.
107. See note 43 supra and accompanying text. But cf. text accompanying notes 50-59
supra.
108. See, e.g., Schneider, supra note 13, at 275.
109. Havighurst, HMOs, supra note 5, at 739-42.
110. Id. at 739-40. As to the medical profession's continuing ability to constrain the
freedom of physicians to delegate medical functions, see Kissam, supra note 53.
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riers to entry in the health professions."' This ignores the fact that
much of HMOs' competitive influence will occur in health insurance
markets, in which some degree of competition already exists."'
D. Potential Disadvantages
Commentators have noted several potential problems with the
HMO concept that are relevant to the establishment of sound HMO
legislation. The most obvious and perhaps most troublesome prob-
lem is that HMOs' reversed financial incentive might result in the
denial of appropriate care in some circumstances.' In some instan-
ces it will be cheaper to let a patient die instead of providing expen-
sive life-maintaining treatment, and there may be opportunities to
provide less expensive but less effective treatment that causes harm
to the patient.' More frequently, HMOs' economizing efforts may
curtail available physician or hospital resources to the extent that
patients' effective access to* services is limited, inadequate treat-
ment plans are formulated, and needed hospital stays are unduly
denied, postponed, or shortened."' There are a number of strong
constraints on HMOs other than possible legislative safeguards that
minimize the risks of underservice. Injured patients may bring mal-
practice suits against HMO physicians and probably against the
HMO as well."' Although some harms from undue economizing by
HMOs may escape the notice of potential malpractice plaintiffs,"7
there is evidence that existing HMOs do maintain appropriate con-
ill. See, e.g., Schneider, supra note 13, at 275.
112. See LAw, supra note 4, at 11-12; Hanson, The Private Insurance Industry and State
Insurance Regulatory Activities as Alternatives to Federally Enacted Comprehensive Na-
tional Health Insurance Legislation, 6 U. TOL. L. Rav. 677, 691-95, 698 (1975).
113. Auger & Goldberg, supra note 3, at 388-90; Havighurst, HMOs, supra note 5, at
722-24, 754-56; Roemer & Shonick, supra note 13, at 309-11.
114. Havighurst, HMOs, supra note 5, at 754.
115. Auger & Goldberg, supra note 3, at 389-90. These latter situations are likely to be
more frequent because they result from organizational decisions that are less subject to the
ethical constraints on individual physicians.
116. See generally Curran & Moseley, The Malpractice Experience of Health Mainte-
nance Organizations, 70 Nw. U.L. Rav. 69 (1975). No MCF and only a few closed-panel HMOs
directly employ their physicians; these organizations instead enter into independent con-
tracts with either participating physicians (MCF) or physician groups (most closed-panel
HMOs) for the provision of medical services. On this basis these HMOs themselves may not
be liable for acts of negligence by their participating physicians. See id. at 70 n.5, 72-73.
Curran and Moseley point out, however, that evolving doctrines of malpractice law and the
nature of HMOs (which in some sense hold themselves out to subscribers as providing medi-
cal care) may result appropriately in direct liability for all HMOs. Id. at 73-77. In any event,
individual participating physicians should have adequate incentive from fear of malpractice
suits to oppose any undue economizing by the HMO. See id. at 83.
117. Havighurst, HMOs, supra note 5, at 755-56.
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cern about the possibility of malpractice litigation and have estab-
lished internal standards and procedures to guard against such inci-
dents." 8 Other constraints against underservice are market competi-
tion for subscribers between HMOs and other insurers, the possibil-
ity of outside evaluations by trade unions or employers who contract
with HMOs for group insurance, and the ethical standards of HMO
physicians."'
The clinic form of service by closed-panel HMOs may engender
an impersonal atmosphere that so disrupts the professional relation-
ship of trust between patient and physician that the quality of care
suffers.'2 This relationship seems important to the quality of health
care because of consumers' relative lack of knowledge about medical
practices, even though the precise role of this relationship in pro-
moting quality has not been well documented.'"' It is true that the
major complaint of closed-panel HMO subscribers has been dissat-
isfaction with the impersonal nature of clinic services, but the tech-
nical quality of care apparently has not suffered, and some evidence
exists that overall satisfaction of closed-panel HMO subscribers is
increasing.'2 2 HMOs should have adequate incentives to minimize
the impersonal nature of their operations in order to compete for
subscribers and to minimize malpractice complaints. Furthermore,
consumers may adjust psychologically to certain inevitable imper-
sonalities of clinic medicine with the passage of time and increasing
availability of HMOs.'1
HMOs, by reason of their relatively unique structure and role
in the medical marketplace, conceivably might promote different
kinds of medical care for different classes, to the disadvantage of
blue collar groups, the poor, and the elderly.' 24 It is argued that
many HMOs might recruit exclusively either among blue collar
groups or among the elderly and poor, and that the HMO incentive
to economize would have particularly deleterious effects on the con-
118. See Curran & Moseley, supra note 116, at 84-86. See also text accompanying notes
50-52 supra.
119. Auger & Goldberg, supra note 3, at 390-91; Havighurst, HMOs, supra note 5, at
756.
120. Klarman, Analysis of the HMO Proposal-Its Assumptions, Implications, and
Prospects, in UNIVERSITY OF CHICAGO CENTER FOR HEALTH ADMINISTRATION STUDIES, HEALTH
MAINTENANCE ORGANIZATIONS: A RECONFIGURATION OF THE HEALTH SERVICES SYSTEM 24, 33
(1971).
121. Id.
122. See Donabedian, supra note 13, at 7-8; Roemer & Shonick, supra note 13, at 304-
07.
123. Roemer & Shonick, supra note 13, at 307.
124. See Havighurst, HMOs, supra note 5, at 723, 751; Schneider & Stem, supra note
13, at 97-101.
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ditions and quality of care provided by these HMOs. On the one
hand, truly nonprofit HMOs 125 may not recruit aggressively among
either the middle class or the poor. 121 These HMOs seem likely to
be sponsored by labor unions, employers, substantial consumer
groups, and university medical centers.2" They may be dominated
by persons "beholden to the organized medical profession 28 and
shy away from middle class recruitment that would offend fee-for-
service providers. They also may avoid recruitment of the elderly
and poor because of alleged higher risk characteristics of these
groups, preferences of their basic constituents, and physical loca-
tion. These HMOs would tend to offer especially low premiums to
attract employers and union leaders who contract for employee
groups. Even if these HMOs provide care that is technically suffi-
cient, the result of low premiums may be over-crowded and less than
comfortable conditions, to which a "second-class image" would be
attached by both subscribers and others.129 This image presumably
would insult subscribers and create potential obstacles to consumer
acceptance of HMOs in general. This problem would not seem to
be a serious one, however, unless employee subscribers to these
HMOs do not have an effective choice of insurance plans, or if the
second-class image is not in fact insulting to subscribers but damag-
ing to consumer acceptance of HMOs in general. On the other hand,
profitmaking HMOs may find that their most substantial market
opportunities lie in inner city areas where they face little direct
competition from established providers. 3 ' Potential subscribers are
likely to be the poor and elderly, whose health benefits are financed
by the Medicare31 and Medicaid ' programs. These persons often
have few, if any, alternatives for medical care, 33 and they may have
125. HMOs, particularly physician-sponsored ones, may be nonprofit in form because
of legal or tax reasons, but return "profits" to physicians in the form of salaries or profit-
sharing agreements. Havighurst, HMOs, supra note 5, at 750.
126. Id. at 751.
127. Id. at 749.
128. Id. at 751.
129. Id.
130. Id. at 745.
131. Title XVIII of the Social Security Act, 42 U.S.C. § 1395 (1970). A brief description
of the Medicare program of health insurance for the elderly may be found in STAFF OF HOUSE
COMM. ON WAYS AND MEANS, 93D CONG., 2D SEss., NATIONAL HEALTH INsURANCE RESOURCE
BOOK 429-33 (1974) [hereinafter cited as RESOURCE BOOK].
132. Title XIX of the Social Security Act, 42 U.S.C. § 1396 (1970). For a summary of
the Medicaid program of health care benefits for the poor see Butler, The Medicaid Program:
Current Statutory Requirements and Judicial Interpretations, 8 CLEARINGHOUSE REV. 7
(1974).
133. Havighurst, HMOs, supra note 5, at 729.
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less ability than the average consumer to negotiate their way
through a complex medical delivery system '34 or to question the
quality of care that is provided. The poor and elderly thus may be
particularly subject to harm from overeconomizing by "poor peo-
ple's" HMOs, and there is evidence in California that this has hap-
pened. 35
Finally, the American Public Health Association '36 and several
commentators'37 have expressed concern that HMOs are likely to
limit their enrollee population to low-risk individuals by using expe-
rience rating (with higher rates for higher risk groups) and by refus-
ing to sell insurance at any price to high-risk individuals. To the
extent that HMOs engage in these practices, they merely are follow-
ing other health insurers in an attempt to remain competitive.1 38
This concern is founded upon the premise that HMOs should be
used as vehicles for reforming health care financing, a premise
which will be discussed subsequently.1 3
III. LEGISLATIVE THEORIES
Professor Havighurst has suggested that HMO supporters fall
into two camps.'4 ° Members of the two camps, whom we refer to as
"quality utopians" and "fair market theorists," have distinctly dif-
ferent ideas about the use of HMOs as a vehicle of health care
reform and, consequently, about the nature of desirable HMO legis-
lation.' In this Part we analyze these approaches and suggest a
third, intermediate strategy as a more effective way of employing
HMOs as a policy instrument. We begin this analysis, however, by
outlining some important elements that are common to all theories.
134. See ROEMER, supra note 4, at 31-32.
135. Schneider & Stem, supra note 13, at 100 n.52, 126-38.
136. American Public Health Association, Health Maintenance Organizations: A Policy
Paper, 61 AM. J. Pun. HEALTH 2524, 2528-36 (1971).
137. See, e.g., Roemer & Shonick, supra note 13, at 309-10; Schneider & Stern, supra
note 13, at 98-99.
138. See Havighurst, HMOs, supra note 5, at 788.
139. See text accompanying notes 174-99 & 295-306 infra.
140. Havighurst & Bovbjerg, supra note 13, at 386-87.
141. Id. Some major statements of the two positions are identified in notes 174 & 201
infra. For purposes of illustration, we use in general the 1973 report on HMOs of the United
States Senate Committee on Labor and Public Welfare, SENATE HMO REPORT I, supra note
5, as the leading statement of the quality utopians' position, and the 1974 report on HMOs
of the Institute of Medicine's Committee to Develop a Policy Statement on Health Mainte-
nance Organizations, IOM REPORT, supra note 1, as a leading statement of the fair market
theorists' approach.
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A. Common Elements in All Theories
All HMO supporters apparently would agree to four general
propositions about the nature of desirable HMO legislation. A first
proposition is that HMO legislation should preempt or amend cer-
tain state laws that unnecessarily restrict HMO development, either
inadvertently or in the interest of fee-for-service providers."' These
restrictions include the effective prohibition of nonprofit HMOs,
other than those sponsored by medical societies, through applica-
tion of Blue Shield enabling laws. These laws typically require any
nonprofit medical service insurance plan to obtain county medical
society approval, to include a certain percentage of local physicians
as members, or to be open to all physicians who desire to join.' All
HMOs, particularly profitmaking ones, may be prohibited by appli-
cation of the hoary, but occasionally viable, common law rule
against the corporate practice of medicine.' Even if HMOs can be
organized, their development also may be hampered by application
of initial capital and reserve requirements established by health
insurance laws'45 and by legal prohibitions against medical
advertising.'
142. See IOM REPORT, supra note 1, at 19-24, 43; SENATE HMO REPoRT I, supra note 5,
at 26-29. See generally Holley & Carlson, supra note 5, at 653-58; Harvard HMO Note, supra
note 13, at 960-76. As noted above at least 25 states in recent years have established HMO
enabling acts, see note 12 supra and accompanying text, and these acts by and large remove
the legal restrictions against HMOs that are described in the text immediately below. Fur-
thermore, a number of HMOs have established themselves successfully in states that have
not had HMO enabling acts. See McNeil & Schlenker, supra note 9, at 198-200; Harvard
HMO Note, supra note 13, at 964-69. Of the 181 operating HMOs as of July 1, 1975, reported
by the HMO CENsus, supra note 9, at 8, 25 were operating in states without HMO enabling
acts. Nonetheless, under the traditional state health insurance and medical practice laws that
remain in many states, HMO entry may be deterred by uncertainty about the legal authority
of HMOs to operate, potential litigation resulting therefrom, and possibly substantial costs
involved in negotiating administrative waivers. See, e.g., note 144 infra.
143. Holley & Carlson, supra note 5, at 654-55; Harvard HMO Note, supra note 13, at
962-63. These commentators also note several cases in which state courts have found constitu-
tional defects in Blue Shield enabling laws and allowed HMOs and other prepaid health
insurance plans to operate.
144. Holley & Carlson, supra note 5, at 657-58. This rule usually has been applied to
profitmaking entities, id. at 657, but for a recent application of the rule against a nonprofit
HMO, see Garcia v. Texas State Bd. of Medical Exam'rs, 384 F. Supp. 434 (W.D. Tex. 1974),
aff'd mem., 421 U.S. 995 (1975). The rationale given for this rule is that quality of care may
suffer if employment of physicians by corporations either shields physicians from the "rigors
of competition" or diverts their loyalty from the patient to the organization. Holley & Carl-
son, supra note 5, at 657. The rule seems outdated in view of the widespread use of malprac-
tice insurance, which also shields physicians from any "rigors of competition" that there may
be, and in view of increasing employment of physicians by hospitals.
145. Holley & Carlson, supra note 5, at 656-57; Harvard HMO Note, supra note 13, at
969-74. For discussion of the generally inappropriate nature of these requirements see text
accompanying notes 172 & 173 infra.
146. Holley & Carlson, supra note 5, at 658. These commentators also point to state
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A second proposition is that HMOs deserve positive govern-
mental assistance to help overcome relatively unique market bar-
riers that have obstructed and may obstruct HMO development.'47
This assistance is of two kinds: developmental subsidies for HMOs
in the form of grants, loans, and loan guarantees; 4 and legislative
rules that promote HMO access to a variety of health insurance
markets.'49 The argument for developmental subsidies is predicated
on the existence of several types of development costs that HMOs
face to a greater extent than other providers or insurers, and on the
existence of other market imperfections that may limit the amount
of private capital invested in HMOs. The development of viable
HMOs must overcome substantial consumer inertia 5" and physician
hesitation' 5' to participate in this different form of practice. HMOs
also require relatively unique and scarce managerial resources,'5 2
and substantial amounts of initial capital for planning costs, operat-
ing deficits while subscriber enrollments are built up, and new out-
patient facilities if not hospitals.'53 The most substantial source of
private capital to meet these needs appears to be existing health
insurance companies, but these institutions may be loath to finance
truly competitive HMOs that take away business.' 4 The level of
private investment in HMOs also may be socially insufficient be-
cause it cannot recapture the external economic benefits that may
result from the competitive stimulus of HMOs on other providers
and insurers."5
Legislative rules to promote HMO access to group markets in-
clude mandates upon employers and government health insurance
programs to provide, when HMOs are available, "an HMO option"
legal restrictions on the delegation of medical acts as another unnecessary restraint on HMO
development. Id. at 659-60. Such restrictions, however, affect all providers, not merely
HMOs, and there is apparently no general agreement on the need to free HMOs from such
restraints. See, e.g., IOM REPORT, supra note 1, at 29 (recommending only that "considera-
tion" be given to reforming state medical acts on this point, and apparently recommending
that this be done with regard to all physicians or all institutions or none at all).
147. See SENATE HMO REPORT I, supra note 5, at 18-19; IOM REPORT, supra note 1, at
32-42; Schneider, supra note 13, at 283-95.
148. See SENATE HMO REPORT I, supra note 5, at 18-19; IOM REPORT, supra note 1, at
32-35.
149. See IOM REPORT, supra note 1, at 38-42; Schneider, supra note 13, at 283-95.
150. See Donabedian, supra note 13, at 4-7.
151. Harvard HMO Note, supra note 13, at 946-48.
152. Id. at 953-54.
153. IOM REPORT, supra note 1, at 32-35.
154. See Schneider, supra note 13, at 301; Harvard HMO Note, supra note 13, at 950.
155. IOM REPORT, supra note 1, at 34. These external benefits of HMOs are described
in the text accompanying notes 101-10 supra.
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in any health benefit plan offered to employees or beneficiaries.'56
They also include guarantees that HMOs contracting with govern-
ment health insurance programs will be reimbursed on an adequate
basis and that beneficiaries of these programs will have adequate
incentives to enroll in HMOs. 5  The argument for these kinds of
rules is predicated on the existence of considerable resistance to
HMO insurance by both private and public employers (and perhaps
union leaders as well), the potential for unfair practices by compet-
ing insurers, and the general failure of government programs to
provide adequate reimbursement schemes for HMOs. HMOs have
faced considerable obstacles in entering employee group health in-
surance markets. 5 ' Simple inertia among employers and union lead-
ers is undoubtedly one element.'59 Another apparent cause is resist-
ance by employers, who fear additional administrative costs if HMO
insurance is offered as an option and additional pressure from em-
ployees for the employer to pay additional amounts needed to cover
HMOs' generally higher premiums." ° Similarly, union leaders may
desire to avoid interjecting the new issue of higher HMO premiums
(to be paid by employer or employee) at the bargaining table.6 ' A
third likely cause is the entrenched position of competing insurers.
Their management may enjoy close personal relationships with both
employers and union leaders."' Furthermore, when faced with
HMO competition, these companies may be in a position to offer
below-cost premiums or refuse to renew coverage for employees
choosing the HMO option.'63
156. See IOM REPORT, supra note 1, at 38-42; Schneider, supra note 13, at 283-95.
157. See Schneider & Stern, supra note 13, at 113-14, 116-21.
158. Schneider, supra note 13, at 286-87. One possible significant exception to this
statement is the market for health insurance for federal government employees. See id. at
289 n.61.
159. The inertia factor is probably compounded when an HMO proposes to insure only
employees of one plant in a multi-plant firm or only those employees of one plant who reside
in a particular geographic area.
160. Schneider, supra note 13, at 286. Some HMOs insist that employees be offered the
option of choosing between the HMO and traditional insurance plans, and in any event such
an option seems attractive as a device for countering potential consumer dissatisfaction. Id.
at 285.
161. Conversation among Philip Kissam, Professor Joseph Harkins of Kansas Univer-
sity Medical Center, and Mr. Allen Meadors, formerly a Vice President of Kansas Blue Cross,
in Lawrence, Kansas, Mar. 11, 1976.
162. Schneider, supra note 13, at 286-87 n.55.
163. See id. These practices may violate state insurance laws or antitrust laws, although
the McCARRAN-FERGUsoN AcT, 15 U.S.C. § 1011 (1970), limits the application of federal
antitrust laws to agreements or acts of boycott, coercion, or intimidation by insurers, id. §
1013(b), and otherwise to the business of insurance only "to the extent that such business is
not regulated by State law," id. § 1012(b).
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HMOs are confronted with a different set of obstacles in at-
tempting to serve beneficiaries of government health insurance pro-
grams. HMOs have participated in Medicare and Medicaid since
the inception of these programs in 1966,184 but until recently they
have participated largely on a cost reimbursement rather than pre-
paid basis.' 5 Cost reimbursement eliminates HMOs' special incen-
tive to economize and also limits their interest in serving Medicare
and Medicaid beneficiaries. This occurs because of the substantial
administrative costs involved in obtaining cost reimbursements
under these programs ' and the absence of any opportunity to retain
cost savings. Even with prepayment, however, HMOs may face dif-
ficulties in obtaining adequate levels of government payment.8 7
Governments acting as third-party payers have an obvious interest
in retaining HMO cost savings for themselves instead of allowing
savings to accrue to HMOs and their subscribers. 8
A third proposition to which all HMO supporters apparently
agree is that HMO legislation must provide suitable safeguards
against the risk of underservice, notwithstanding the considerable
sanctions against underservice that already exist. ' Opinions differ
about the full range of appropriate safeguards,1 7 but a consensus
appears at a minimum to include regulations providing for licensure
of HMOs, government monitoring of statistical reports, subscriber
grievance procedures monitored by a government body, disclosure
requirements for marketing of insurance policies, and a guaranteed
option for subscribers to withdraw from HMOs at periodic inter-
vals.' 7' The final common element among HMO legislative theories
is that HMO legislation must protect HMO subscribers from any
unexpected loss of insurance coverage due to an HMO's financial
164. Schneider & Stern, supra note 13, at 111.
165. Havighurst & Bovbjerg, supra note 13, at 383 n.9. One reason for HMOs' limited
participation on a prepayment basis in Medicare and Medicaid has been inadequate statu-
tory authorization, a problem now cured by amendments that are discussed in the text
accompanying notes 407-59 infra.
166. See, e.g., Schneider & Stem, supra note 13, at 117 n.134.
167. See id. at 113-21.
168. See text accompanying notes 429-38 infra.
169. See SENATE HMO REPORT I, supra note 5, at 31-34; IOM REPORT, supra note 1, at
55-61; text accompanying notes 116-18 supra.
170. Compare Schneider, supra note 13, at 273 (consumer participation in HMO gover-
nance is "essential" to consumer accountability, which is needed to counter HMOs' incentive
for underservice), with IOM REPORT, supra note 1, at 48 (consumer participation in HMO
governance "is not an essential characteristic of a good HMO").
171. See SENATE HMO REPORT I, supra note 5, at 16-17, 34-45; IOM REPORT, supra note
1, at 55-61.
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difficulties. 7 2 Because HMOs provide many of their benefits in kind
rather than cash, however, it generally is recognized that regulation
of HMOs' financial condition should be more flexible than the con-
servative capital and reserve requirements that are applied to other
health insurers.73
We turn next to an analysis of the basic differences between the
two camps of HMO supporters and their legislative theories. These
differences focus around two related questions: (1) the nature of a
"qualified HMO," that is, the kind of HMO that should be pro-
moted by federal or state legislation; and (2) the scope of benefits
to be conferred upon qualified HMOs. As a result of these differ-
ences, the two camps propose markedly different kinds of HMO
legislation.
B. The Quality Utopians
Many supporters of HMOs perceive them as a policy instru-
ment for implementing a broad set of reforms in American health
care. "'74 This approach places substantial reliance on governmental
regulation in order to ensure development only of those HMOs that
can carry out the desired reforms. These reforms, not necessarily in
order of importance, are the need to provide more economical health
care, the need to provide a variety of quality improvements in
health care, and the need to redistribute health resources to rela-
tively needy persons, including attempts to eliminate "dual-track"
medicine. 7 5 The perceived need to provide more economical services
is common to all legislative theories and need not be discussed here.
The proposed quality improvements include requirements that
qualified HMOs provide comprehensive insurance coverage, with
particular emphasis on screening and preventive care services, con-
tinuous medical care to any patient under the direction of one re-
172. See SENATE HMO REPORT I, supra note 5, at 56-57; IOM REPORT, supra note 1, at
23-24.
173. See IOM REPORT, supra note 1, at 23-24; Harvard HMO Note, supra note 13, at
969-74. But cf. IOM REPORT, supra note 1, at 68 (a dissenting opinion claiming that the
efficacy of alternatives to reserve requirements is not clear and deserves study).
174. See, e.g., SENATE HMO REPORT I, supra note 5, at 7-28; W. Roy, THE PROPOSED
HEALTH MAINTENANCE ORGANIZATION Acr OF 1972, at 13-19 (1972); American Public Health
Association, Health Maintenance Organizations, 61 AM. J. PUB. HEALTH 2528 (1971); Schnei-
der, supra note 13. We do not suggest that these and other quality utopians have a common
position on all issues. For example, Roy and Schneider appear to adopt more realistic posi-
tions than others on various issues. See, e.g., note 185 infra and accompanying text.
175. See SENATE HMO REPORT I, supra note 5, at 2, 7-18. For a description of the
existing dual-track of medical care in this country and its alleged problems see Schneider,
supra note 13, at 318-26.
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sponsible professional and by use of unitary medical records, con-
sumer participation in HMO governance to ensure more accessible
and convenient care, substantially increased patient health educa-
tion services, and increased continuing education for health profes-
sionals. 76 The proposed distributional reforms include requirements
that HMOs use community rather than experience rating to estab-
lish premiums, and hold open enrollment periods during which sub-
scribers are accepted without regard to health status.17 1 In order to
help eliminate dual-track medicine, it also is proposed that HMOs
limit enrollment of subscribers from low income areas to a given
percentage7 and that HMOs affirmatively recruit low income and
elderly subscribers within such limits. 179 In the words of Professor
Havighurst, a commentator from the other side, quality utopians
value HMOs "as a model health care system, providing a large
population with comprehensive services of good quality and plowing
savings from efficiency in resource use back into improved accessi-
bility, better care, and more extensive services."'' s
The quality utopians' desire to promote only model HMOs
appears to contain two major, related difficulties. First, many desir-
able qualities of model HMOs are likely to require substantial re-
sources in addition to those available to existing HMOs.'"' These
additional resources can be obtained in three ways: by increasing
HMO premiums and cost-sharing provisions, which seems likely to
price many HMOs out of the health insurance market;12 by
continuing government subsidies, which simply may never be avail-
able; 8E and, to a limited extent, by "plowing back" into services
those savings achieved by more efficient resource use, which cer-
tainly will limit HMO development by reducing the attractiveness
of HMOs to investors and some consumers. Thus the consequence
of requiring all HMOs to implement a multiple set of health care
176. See SENATE HMO REPORT I, supra note 5, at 7-18.
177. See id. at 29-30.
178. Id. at 17-18.
179. Schneider, supra note 13, at 321-26.
180. Havighurst & Bovbjerg, supra note 13, at 386.
181. See text accompanying notes 254-306 infra.
182. See, e.g., McNeil & Schlenker, supra note 9, at 216-17.
183. Quality utopians at times have premised their legislative proposals on the assump-
tion or hope that a relatively generous national health insurance program would be enacted
shortly, which would provide HMOs with additional resources. See, e.g., SENATE HMO RE-
PORT I, supra note 5, at 29. The political wisdom and likelihood of this happening is beyond
the scope of this Article, although it may be noted that the political climate in 1976 does not
appear to bode well for such a program. As to questions about the wisdom of such a program,
see generally AEI ANALYSIS, supra note 35. Similarly, state legislatures cannot be expected
realistically to provide HMOs with additional resources. Schneider, supra note 13, at 276-77.
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reforms may be to retard HMO development severely. The quality
utopians answer this argument in two ways: first, that development
of model HMOs is an experimental process, which understandably
should take a relatively long period of time;'84 and secondly, that
regulators (legislators and administrators) should balance the cost
impact of various model HMO requirements against the need of
HMOs for economic viability, and impose only relatively high prior-
ity requirements to the extent practicable.'85 These answers, how-
ever, lead to a second set of objections to the theory of exclusive or
predominant development of model HMOs.
Model HMOs rightfully may be viewed as an experiment, in
view of the remarkably little evidence available to determine
whether the quality and distributional reforms to be implemented
by model HMOs will improve health outcomes substantially."'
There may be justification for substantial subsidies to develop a
relatively few, closely monitored model HMOs to help answer this
question, but it does not follow that nonmodel HMOs are undeserv-
ing of legislative action to remove barriers to their expansion. Non-
model HMOs have demonstrated a capacity to reduce costs sub-
stantially without sacrificing quality, and HMO theory suggests
that wider benefits may be obtained by substantial expansion of
such HMOs.' 7 A governmental policy designed to promote only
model HMOs, however, can guarantee merely health care of the
184. See IOM REPORT, supra note 1, at 7; N.Y. Times, May 17, 1976, at 16, col. 5
(remarks of Dr. Philip Caper, a member of Senator Kennedy's staff). The American Medical
Association has taken this position with respect to all HMOs, but this position is perhaps
more a delaying tactic than support for the quality utopians' approach. See Rosoff, supra note
13, at 213.
185. See Schneider, supra note 13, at 275-76.
186. See, e.g., SENATE HMO REPORT I, supra note 5, at 10-17. For a review of the
literature and a generally inconclusive answer to the question whether increased health insur-
ance in general has a favorable effect on health, see AEI ANALYsis, supra note 35, at 9-12.
There is evidence that increased maternity and well-child care and increased health services
for the elderly may have a favorable impact upon health status, see text accompanying notes
87-89 supra, and we suggest above that expanded insurance coverage of drugs by HMOs
might help limit harmful effects from unnecessary prescriptions. See notes 72-76 supra and
accompanying text. The quality utopians, however, propose that qualified HMOs be subject
to much more comprehensive and costly requirements. See text accompanying notes 176-79
supra. Social values other than improved health outcomes, such as more dignified and con-
siderate treatment of individuals, may be desired from HMO development. See, e.g., Sch-
neider, supra note 13, at 273-74 n.20. In view of the very real problem of allocative ineffi-
ciency in American health care, see Havighurst & Blumstein, supra note 38, at 9-20, and the
self-defeating nature of the quality utopians' proposals for HMOs, see text accompanying
note 199 infra, it does not seem wise to expect HMOs alone to carry the burden of imple-
menting these and other values.
187. See text accompanying notes 101-07 supra.
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"nicest possible kind' ' 8 to a relatively few subscribers, or to a larger
number if substantial subsidies are provided. Since our health care
system already appears to consume too many resources," 9 this result
does not seem to justify legislative inattention to, or continuing
restriction of, nonmodel HMOs. Alternatively, model HMOs might
be promoted exclusively by the compromise method of balancing
the cost impact of various model HMO requirements against
HMOs' need for economic viability. This approach suffers from the
failure of the quality utopians to suggest criteria by which some
model HMO requirements are to be considered more important
than others and worth the extra cost. Some guidance on this issue
seems necessary if regulation by a balancing method is to maximize
social gains from HMO development. 90
Notwithstanding these objections, the quality utopians' legisla-
tive theory suggests a potentially significant insight into the nature
of health care policymaking in the United States. Their desire to
attach general health care reforms to newly developing HMOs may
constitute an implicit recognition that such reforms realistically
cannot be obtained in a more direct manner, by regulation of all
providers and by substantially increased public funding. If direct
reforms are unrealistic, because of political opposition or lack of
administrative feasibility, the regulation of HMOs to implement
reforms indirectly would seem to have substantial virtue. Professor
Hirschman, a Harvard economist, has pointed approvingly to the
use of a similar "reformmongering" insight by economic planners in
less developed countries. 9 ' He argues that many severe social prob-
lems may not receive governmental attention because the victims
of these problems lack effective access to policymakers. 2 In this
environment reformers may succeed in bringing a "non-visible"
problem to policymakers' attention and in obtaining a reform solu-
tion by either of two indirect methods. First, reformers can argue
that solution of the non-visible problem is necessary for solution of
another problem that already has policymakers' attention, but has
188. Havighurst, State Regulation of HMO's: Arranging for a "Fair Market Test", in
SUBCOMM. ON RURAL DEVELOPMENT OF THE SENATE COMM. ON AGRICULTURE AND FORESTRY, 93D
CONG., 2D SESS., RURAL HEALTH CARE DELIVERY: PROCEEDINGS OF A NATIONAL CONFERENCE ON
RURAL HEALTH MAINTENANCE ORGANIZATIONS, LOUIsvILLE, KENTUCKY, JULY 8-10, 1974, at 90,
(Comm. Print 1974) [hereinafter cited as Havighurst, State Regulation of HMOs].
189. See Havighurst & Blumstein, supra note 38, at 9-28; note 10 supra.
190. We suggest such criteria in the text accompanying notes 218 & 219 infra.
191. A. HIRSCHMAN, JOURNEYS TOWARD PROGRESS: STUDIES OF ECONOMIC POLICY-MAKING
IN LATIN AMERICA 227-97 (1973) [hereinafter cited as HIRSCHMAN].
192. Id. at 229-31.
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stubbornly resisted treatment.'93 Secondly, reformers may focus pol-
icymakers' attention on a non-visible problem in a more general
manner, by arguing that solution of the problem is now possible for
the first time if wider use is made of a newly available policy instru-
ment.'94
The current state of health care policymaking in this country
seems similar to that of economic policymaking in less developed
countries, and the quality utopians may be viewed as using both of
Professor Hirschman's reformmongering techniques in an attempt
to achieve quality and distributional reforms by HMO regulation.
As is the case generally in less-developed countries, sustained gov-
ernmental health care policymaking in this country is of relatively
recent origin,' 5 and occurs in a political environment dominated by
powerful elites that are resistant to change.199 Moreover, many of the
bad effects of inferior quality and poorly distributed health care
resources are experienced by victims in widely disparate circum-
stances, a situation that is not conducive to commanding the atten-
tion of policymakers.'97 These considerations as well as society's
related inexperience in measuring and treating health policy prob-
lems, may cause important issues to remain non-visible to govern-
mental decisionmakers. The quality utopians have made at least
implicit use of both reformmongering techniques. At times they
have justified imposition of very comprehensive insurance require-
ments on HMOs as a means of ensuring that HMOs reduce health
care costs.'98 This may be seen as an attempt to solve a non-visible
problem (untreated health problems stemming from inadequate
insurance coverage) by arguing that its solution is necessary to treat
a very visible problem, rising health care costs. More significantly,
the quality utopians' attachment of numerous quality and distribu-
tional reforms to HMOs may be viewed as an argument that solu-
tions to several non-visible problems have become possible for the
first time by wider use of a newly available policy instrument, the
HMO.
193. Id. at 231-32.
194. Id. at 233-35.
195. See Chapman & Talmadge, Historical and Political Background of Federal Health
Care Legislation, 35 LAW & CONTEMP. PROB. 334 (1970).
196. See, e.g., R. HARRIS, A SACRED TRUST (1969); LAW, supra note 4; Kessel, The
A.M.A. and the Supply of Physicians, 35 LAW & CONTEMP.PROB. 267 (1970); The American
Medical Association: Power, Purpose and Politics in Organized Medicine, 63 YALE L.J. 938
(1954).
197. See HIRSCHMAN, supra note 191, at 229.
198. SENATE HMO REPORT I, supra note 5, at 10. This argument is discussed in the text
accompanying notes 67-71 supra.
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The legislative approach of the quality utopians towards HMOs
may be seen as an attempt to use reformmongering techniques in a
comprehensive manner. The essential problem with this approach,
it seems to us, does not lie with use of the techniques per se, but
rather with the overly broad scope of their application. This ap-
proach promises to be self-defeating since little HMO expansion is
likely to occur under governmental regulation of the sort proposed
by the quality utopians. ' The theory outlined below"' attempts to
avoid this problem by focusing only on certain specific desirable
reforms that can be attached to HMOs without significantly retard-
ing their development.
C. The Fair Market Theorists
The second group of HMO supporters"0 ' contends that HMO
legislation should have only one basic goal. This is the removal of
legal, institutional, and other obstacles to HMO development in
order to give HMOs a "fair market test" to see if they can provide
an increased degree of price and quality competition in the market
for health services. 212 This approach views HMOs as a policy instru-
ment uniquely designed to address the problem of rising costs and
inefficiencies in our health care system. Although proponents of this
theory recognize that HMO development also may improve resource
distribution and the quality of health care, they argue that govern-
mental regulation of HMOs to address these problems should be
avoided in order to increase HMO development.2 3 Any such im-
provements resulting from HMOs, they argue, should come from a
decision by consumers to pay for these improvements. In the view
of these theorists, HMO legislation should be limited to removing
all legal and market obstacles to HMO development and to provid-
ing minimum necessary safeguards against inadequate quality and
financial insolvency. The legislation should not impose other re-
quirements on HMOs, because to do so would tend to increase
HMOs' costs and reduce their potential for promoting cost-effective
performance in the American medical economy.0 4
199. See text accompanying notes 254-315 infra.
200. See text accompanying notes 218-31 infra.
201. See IOM REPORT, supra note 1; Ellwood, supra note 61; Havighurst, HMOs, supra
note 5; McNeil & Schlenker, supra note 9.
202. IOM REPORT, supra note 1, at 3-5. A detailed statement of the theory underlying
this approach is provided in Havighurst, HMOs, supra note 5, at 743-47. Professor Havighurst
was a member of the committee that prepared the IOM REPORT.
203. See Havighurst & Bovbjerg, supra note 13, at 387.
204. IOM REPORT, supra note 1, at 4-5, 13-29.
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The great strength of this approach lies with its use of economic
market theory to suggest potential benefits from substantial expan-
sion of nonmodel HMOs and to suggest useful means for promoting
such expansion. Fair market theorists have made at least four kinds
of major contributions to the debate over desirable HMO legisla-
tion. First, they have emphasized the potential external benefits
(improved behavior by HMO competitors) that may be obtained if
HMOs develop into a substantial sector of the American medical
economy.1 5 The recognition of such benefits supports the idea that
nonmodel as well as model HMOs should be promoted by legislative
action. Secondly, these observers have emphasized that statutes
requiring HMOs to provide comprehensive insurance coverage and
assume full financial risk of their coverage can defeat market devel-
opment of new and smaller HMOs by imposition of additional
costs. 26 Mandatory comprehensive coverage may increase HMO
premiums that are already relatively high, which increases the risk
of entry for new HMOs. The development of new and smaller HMOs
on a permanent basis also may be viable only if HMOs can protect
against risk by obtaining substantial reinsurance. The merit in ex-
panding opportunities for new HMOs seems clear unless one accepts
the quality utopians' experimental approach. In addition, smaller
HMOs may be the only effective form of HMO organization in rural
areas, 27 and these HMOs may provide certain quality benefits that
larger HMOs do not, such as a greater range of specialist services
and more personalized care. 28
Thirdly, fair market theorists, more than other HMO support-
ers, seem to be acutely aware of general legal restrictions on medical
care that may unfairly obstruct HMO development. The fair market
theorists have recommended that any governmental HMO policy
should attempt to broaden physicians' legal power to delegate medi-
cal acts because any undue restriction on medical delegation will
have a particularly harmful effect on HMOs that have the organiza-
tional structure and incentive to pursue efficiencies in this area.29
They also have demonstrated the potentially negative effects on
HMO development and performance that may result from Profes-
205. See, e.g., Havighurst, HMOs, supra note 5, at 743-47.
206. See, e.g., IOM REPORT, supra note 1, at 44-46.
207. Havighurst, State Regulation of HMOs, supra note 188, at 92-93.
208. Havighurst, HMOs, supra note 5, at 746-47. The greater range of specialists would
result from the fact that smaller HMOs would have to purchase specialists' services outside
their organization more frequently than larger HMOs. Id.
209. IOM REPORT, supra note 1, at 28-29.
1194 [Vol. 29:1163
HEALTH MAINTENANCE ORGANIZATIONS
sional Standards Review Organization regulation10 and certificate-
of-need regulation of new health facilities,2"' and they have recom-
mended that HMOs be exempted from or given special considera-
tion under these regulatory schemes that have been designed pri-
marily to control costs in the fee-for-service sector. 1
2
Fourthly, these theorists have suggested an apparently ingen-
ious market solution to the problems of (1) ensuring fair and ade-
quate payments by government insurance programs to HMOs 2 3 and
(2) guarding against the particular risk of HMOs underserving the
poor. 24 They argue that if HMO enrollment of government program
beneficiaries is limited sharply, for example to fifty percent, then
the government program should pay the HMO the same premium
it charges its other enrollees, without attempting to base the govern-
mental rate on actual costs or otherwise attempting to capture
HMO savings.2 15 The HMO's need to keep its premium rate down
and maintain its quality at an adequate level in order to attract at
least fifty percent of its enrollees from the private market would
assure that the government is paying a fair rate for services of ade-
quate quality. One possible problem with this solution is that
HMOs (particularly urban ones) serving any substantial number of
elderly and poor beneficiaries of government health programs may
find it impossible to obtain fifty percent membership from other
populations because of locational or image factors. 21 1 Unless reason-
able waivers from the fifty percent government beneficiary limita-
tion are available, this proposal could work unfairly to deny the
benefits of HMOs to the urban poor.217
Notwithstanding these significant contributions, the fair mar-
ket test theory does appear to contain one major weakness. It fails
to recognize any place in HMO legislation for use of the
reformmongering technique to achieve desirable health care reforms
other than general efficiencies. We argue in the next section that
government regulation of HMOs can be used in a limited fashion
210. Havighurst & Bovbjerg, supra note 13. This issue is discussed in the text accompa-
nying notes 281-86 infra.
211. Havighurst, Regulation of Health Facilities and Services by "Certificate of Need",
59 VA. L. REV. 1143, 1204-15 (1973) [hereinafter cited as Havighurst, Certificate of Need
Regulation]. This issue is discussed in the text accompanying notes 371-87 infra.
212. See IOM REPORT, supra note 1, at 25-28, 31-32; Havighurst & Bovbjerg, supra note
13, at 411-211.
213. This problem is described in the text accompanying notes 164-68 supra.
214. This problem is described in the text accompanying notes 128-35 supra.
215. Havighurst, HMOs, supra note 5, at 729-32.
216. See Schneider & Stem, supra note 13, at 106-09, particularly n.78.
217. Id.
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to achieve certain of these reforms, and we also argue that this can
be done without much, if any, sacrifice of HMO expansion.
D. A Theory of Limited Reformmongering
Based on the foregoing analysis of HMOs and conflicting legis-
lative theories, we submit that the most effective HMO legislation
can be obtained by carefully limited use of the reformmongering
technique noted above,2 1 and otherwise general use of fair market
test principles. This approach is admittedly similar to the fair mar-
ket test in that it places major emphasis on the use of HMOs to
introduce greater competition and efficiency into American health
care. It also focuses, however, on the use of HMOs to achieve other
specific health care reforms that seem highly desirable, are not
likely to be achieved by operation of market forces or by direct
governmental regulation, and seem attainable indirectly by their
attachment to HMOs through governmental regulation.
The reformmongering technique may be of substantial value as
an alternative to doing nothing about needed reforms if it is used
under three limiting conditions that are designed to ensure that
substantial social benefits may be obtained from HMO regulation
at relatively little risk of retarding HMO development. The first
condition is the existence of some evidence that the particular regu-
lation may provide a substantial "pay-off" in terms of improved
health outcomes or efficiencies of a specific kind. The second condi-
tion is that the reform is not likely to be achieved generally by
HMOs in the absence of regulation. The third condition is the exist-
ence of evidence that the regulation will not jeopardize substantially
the competitive position of HMOs vis-a-vis other providers and in-
surers.
At least three types of HMO regulation appear to satisfy the
above conditions. First, it seems desirable to establish regulations
that positively encourage HMOs to make maximum use of medical
delegations by physicians to nonphysicians. Evidence suggests that
much expanded medical delegation can improve efficiency and re-
duce costs substantially without sacrificing quality.219 In theory, the
218. See text accompanying notes 191-98 supra.
219. See Kissam, supra note 53, at 3-11. One economic study found that current use of
physician's assistants in physicians' offices may increase physician productivity from 40% to
74%, depending upon the extent of delegation by the physician. Smith, Miller & Golloday,
An Analysis of the Optimal Use of Inputs in the Production of Medical Services, 7 J. HuM.
REs. 208, 218-23 (1972). A second less rigorous economic evaluation of nurse practitioners
found some economic benefit for physicians employing nurse practitioners instead of profes-
sional nurses in their office practices. Yankauer, Tripp, Andrews & Connelly, The Costs of
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economizing incentive of HMOs should lead them to make such use
of nonphysicians, but in fact HMOs apparently have not done so
because of both professional and consumer hesitation about this
new form of medical practice, as well as existing legal restrictions."
Successful implementation of expanded delegation would reduce
rather than increase HMOs' costs, and some quality of care benefits
might result as well. 2 ' It can be argued that forcing HMOs into
expanded medical delegation may increase their impersonal, clini-
cal atmosphere and jeopardize their competitive position vis-a-vis
fee-for-service providers. To guard against this, patient and profes-
sional education in the advantages of expanded delegation should
be provided, a step that should not be overly costly. Furthermore,
the regulatory scheme need not force HMOs into quantifiable
amounts of expanded delegation; instead it can require merely that
HMOs and their consumers engage in a self-education and discov-
ery process. Accordingly, HMO legislation not only should ensure
that HMOs are free from any undue restrictions against expanded
delegation in state licensure laws,'2 2 but also should encourage ex-
panded delegation by requiring HMOs to make maximum feasible
medical use of nonphysicians,2 3 to report annually on their progress
towards this goal, and to provide appropriate education of profes-
sionals and consumers that is designed to implement the goal.
Secondly, under the limited reformmongering theory HMO leg-
islation should require that HMO insurance policies cover all drug
costs incurred in relation to other covered services. 224 We already
have noted that drug coverage by HMOs can reduce drug costs
Training and the Income Generation Potential of Pediatric Nurse Practitioners, 49 PEDIATRICS
878, 882-84 (1972).
220. See text accompanying notes 50-59 supra.
221. Some studies of expanded medical delegation have found that increased personal
attention to patients provided by paraprofessionals may improve the quality of care in terms
of better patient understanding of the treatment, higher retention rates, and fewer missed
appointments. See, e.g., Bessman, Comparison of Medical Care in Nurse Clinician and Physi-
cian Clinics in Mfedical School Affiliated Hospitals, 27 J. CHRON. Dis. 115 (1974); Lewis,
Resnik, Schmidt & Waxman, Activities, Events and Outcomes in Ambulatory Patient Care,
280 NEw ENG. J. MED. 645 (1969); Runyan, The Memphis Chronic Disease Program: Compar-
isons in Outcome and the Nurse's Extended Role, 231 J.A.M.A. 264 (1975).
222. This proposal is part of the fair market test theory. See text accompanying note
209 supra.
223. Without quantification, this proposed statutory goal is necessarily vague. It is
designed merely to insure that regulatory agencies and HMOs engage in periodic negotiations
that by themselves may stimulate more recalcitrant HMOs in the direction of expanded
delegation.
224. Professor Havighurst deserves credit for this suggestion, Havighurst, HMOs, supra
note 5, at 779-81, although it clearly is inconsistent with the fair market test that he has
helped to develop.
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substantially25 and may yield substantial quality benefits by avoid-
ing unnecessary prescriptions. 2 1 HMOs may and do refrain from
offering full or even much drug coverage in order to keep their prem-
iums down.227 This suggests that requiring full drug coverage by
HMOs, but not by all insurers, may seriously jeopardize HMOs'
competitive position. Most drug costs, however, probably are in-
curred whether or not they are covered by insurance, 28 and many
consumers are undoubtedly well aware of out-of-pocket drug
costs.229 These facts suggest that a minimal educational effort by
HMOs should be sufficient to overcome any consumer resistance to
higher premiums resulting from expanded drug coverage.
Thirdly, under this theory HMO legislation should require
those HMOs that provide primary medical care to cover complete
prenatal and postnatal medical care for mother and child and well-
child care in the same manner that they cover other primary care
services. We make this proposal somewhat less confidently than the
previous two because of an absence of data about the extent to
which these services are currently consumed in the fee-for-service
sector and covered by traditional health insurance plans. If these
services are not consumed or covered in substantial amounts, this
requirement could raise HMO premiums substantially in a manner
that could not be explained to consumers as easily as higher prem-
iums caused by full drug coverage. Nonetheless, there is evidence
that this kind of care can have a substantially favorable impact on
health outcomes. 30 Moreover, if HMOs provide such services their
economizing incentive may cause them to increase the education of
mothers in child care, an apparently significant variable in child
health.2 3' Perhaps the best way to implement this regulation is to
require such care, but provide for an administrative waiver of the
requirement upon a showing that the HMO's economic viability
would be jeopardized.
225. See note 22 supra and accompanying text.
226. See notes 72-76 supra and accompanying text.
227. See text accompanying notes 23-24 supra.
228. This would seem to be true because of the relatively small amount paid for drugs
each time, and the fact that prescriptions result only after the consumer has already commit-
ted himself to medical care.
229. Consider, for example, the medical deductions part of Form 1040 under the Inter-
nal Revenue Code.
230. See text accompanying notes 87-89 supra.
231. See AEI ANALYSIS, supra note 35, at 11-12.
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IV. FEDERAL HMO LEGISLATION
Since 1972 the federal government has enacted three laws de-
signed specifically to promote and regulate HMOs: the Health
Maintenance Organization Act of 1973232 (Federal HMO Act); an
amendment to the Medicare law establishing conditions for HMO
participation in the Medicare program on a prepaid basis2 3 (Medi-
care HMO Provision); and an amendment to the Medicaid law
providing express authority for state Medicaid agencies to contract
with HMOs on a prepaid basisP4 (Medicaid HMO Provision). As of
September 13, 1976, a congressional conference committee had re-
solved differences between Senate and House Bills that would
amend all three laws, and had filed its report with the Senate and
House25 (the 1976 HMO Amendments). In this Part we analyze
these laws and proposed laws from our position as "limited reform-
mongerers"' 6 and we raise questions about the desirability of sev-
eral important provisions.
Two preliminary observations should be made about the rela-
tionship between federal and state HMO legislation. First, existing
federal laws regulate by establishing qualifying conditions that
HMO's must satisfy in order to obtain certain benefits. This legisla-
tion does not attempt to regulate all HMOs, nor does it preempt all
state regulation of qualified HMOs. Moreover, the restrictive nature
of current federal HMO legislation makes it unlikely that most
HMOs will be willing and able to qualify for its benefits, although
this situation will be changed to some extent by the 1976 HMO
Amendments. In any event, the basic structure of federal HMO
legislation appears to leave substantial scope for state promotion
and regulation of HMOs.
232. 42 U.S.C. § 300e (Supp. V, 1975).
233. 42 U.S.C. § 1395mm (Supp. V, 1975).
234. 42 U.S.C. § 1396a(a)(23) (Supp. V, 1975).
235. COMMITTEE OF CONFERENCE, CONFERENCE REPORT, HEALTH MAINTENANCE ORGANIZA-
TION AMENDMENTS OF 1976, H.R. 9019, H.R. REP. No. 1513, 94th Cong., 2d Sess. (1976)
[hereinafter cited as CONFERENCE REPORT].
236. Because of the newness of federal and state HMO legislation and the correspond-
ingly limited experience thereunder, we do not aspire to the somewhat grander title of "Mas-
ter Reformmongerer" that Professor Hirschman has bestowed on two Latin American eco-
nomic planners. HIRSCHMAN, supra note 191, at the acknowledgement page. Nonetheless, it
seems important to make judgments about the nature of desirable HMO legislation at this
time. Present decisions will help determine the pattern of and perhaps unreasonably limit
HMO development in the future because of political inertia and the growth of vested interests
in existing regulatory schemes. Cf. Ackerman, Regulating Slum Housing Markets on Behalf
of the Poor Of Housing Codes, Housing Subsidies, and Income Redistribution Policy, 80 YALE
L.J. 1093, 1100-01 (1971).
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Secondly, on a theoretical level one should come to terms with
the question of appropriate federal-state relationships in the regula-
tion of HMOs. 3 ' At one extreme, the federal role might be limited
to providing "seed" money and other government assistance only for
model HMOs of the type called for by the quality utopians. This
would have the political advantage of preserving the states' tradi-
tional interest in health regulation. This approach also might have
the advantage of permitting experimentation with different forms
of regulation, although in fact much state HMO legislation is pat-
terned after a single model. 5 At the other extreme, the federal
government might try to preempt states entirely from HMO regula-
tion on the policy grounds that all HMOs deserve benefits that can
be provided only by federal law or resources ' and that the greater
political power of HMO opponents at the state level will make much
state HMO legislation unduly restrictive.40 These considerations
appear to be persuasive reasons for an extensive, although not exclu-
sive, federal role in promoting HMOs.241 A concurrent role for state
237. See generally Holley & Carlson, supra note 5, at 668-81.
238. See Schneider & Stern, supra note 13, at 123. A model act prepared by the Na-
tional Association of Insurance Commissioners has been the template for more than half of
the state HMO acts listed in note 12 supra. For a brief description of this act see Hanson,
supra note 112, at 703-08.
239. There are at least 3 types of benefits that HMOs may not be able to obtain from
state legislation because of legal or political considerations. First, state legislation cannot
relieve HMOs from unduly restrictive federal laws that regulate all medical care. We argue
below that there are 2 such laws from which HMOs deserve relief. See text accompanying
notes 281-86 & 371-87 infra. Secondly, only 2 states have mandated that private employers
offer an HMO option as part of any health benefits plan offered to employees, MIcH. COMP.
LAWS ANN. § 325.943 (1975); WASH. REV. CODE ANN. § 48.46.180 (Supp. 1975), and states may
be preempted from mandating such an option for organized employees because of the
inconsistency between such a requirement and the federal policy of promoting collective
bargaining under the National Labor Relations Act. See Teamsters Local 24 v. Oliver, 358
U.S. 283, 295-97 (1959), aff'd on rehearing, 362 U.S. 605 (1960). Thirdly, only one state has
provided for developmental subsidies as part of its HMO act, MINN. STAT. ANN. § 62D.27(2)
(Supp. 1976), and states are not likely to provide many resources for this function. Schneider,
supra note 13, at 276-77. The federal government might provide these benefits and still
recognize concurrent state regulation, but to do so would jeopardize its investment in HMOs
if state legislation is overly restrictive.
240. See generally Kissam & Johnson, State HMO Laws and the Theory of Limited
Reformmongering (to be published in a forthcoming issue of the Kansas Law Review). Al-
though existing state HMO legislation is more liberal than the Federal HMO Act in several
respects, the new state laws do contain a number of similar restrictive features such as open
enrollment requirements and prohibitions against HMO advertising referring to quality of
care issues. The state laws also tend to impose rate regulation on HMOs, and they do very
little to promote HMOs by providing positive forms of government assistance, see note 239
supra. Moreover, only about half of the states have enacted HMO laws, and in other states
HMOs may face substantial problems under traditional state health insurance and medical
practice laws. See notes 142-46 supra and accompanying text.
241. Holley & Carlson, supra note 5, at 668-77, recommended exclusive federal regula-
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regulation seems appropriate, particularly if it is limited to control-
ling HMOs' financial conditions, marketing practices, and quality
of care, and is made subject to federal review. This approach might
be politically advantageous in obtaining broad support for effective
federal laws. It also would permit reliance on state governments'
considerable expertise in regulating the financial conditions of
health insurance companies and on the closer political relationship
between state agencies and the public.
A strategy that recognizes concurrent state regulation also
might encourage more state governments to promote HMO access
to state and local government employees . 4 2 This area of HMO regu-
tion of HMOs, but their argument was made prior to the enactment of the new state HMO
legislation and was grounded at least in part on the difficult legal environment created for
HMOs by traditional state health insurance and medical practice laws. See id. at 677-81.
Exclusive federal regulation, or indeed any federal preemption of state laws applying to
HMOs, will raise questions about the constitutional power of the federal government to
override state legislation in the health area. Id., Havighurst, HMOs, supra note 5, at 781-84.
At least 3 arguments of varying persuasive effect may be made to establish this power. First,
Congress has the power to regulate insurance transactions that extend beyond state lines,
United States v. South-Eastern Underwriters Ass'n, 322 U.S. 533 (1944), and traditional
health insurers would seem to be sufficiently engaged in interstate transactions to be subject
to this power. Commercial health insurers typically do business in states as foreign companies
in the same manner as commercial fire insurers were doing business in South-Eastern Under-
writers Ass'n. Compare KAN. STAT. ANN. § 40-1210 (1973), with 322 U.S. at 541-42. State Blue
Cross and Blue Shield carriers have more localized operations, but local plans are members
of national organizations that perform commercial services for the local plans including,
importantly, the solicitation and maintenance of national accounts from multi-state unions
and companies. See LAW, supra note 4, at 20-21. Admittedly, HMOs' insurance transactions
will be intrastate in character, but they should have a significant effect on other insurers.
See text accompanying notes 101-12 supra. Thus a persuasive argument may be made that
preemption of any state laws that retard HMO development is justified by the federal interest
in promoting HMOs as an indirect device for regulating health insurance markets. See Havi-
ghurst, HMOs, supra note 5, at 783-84. Secondly, HMO development may have a significant
impact on the interstate flow of drugs. See id. at 778-80; text accompanying notes 22 & 72-
76 supra. If so, preemption of state laws that inhibit HMOs could be justified as an attempt
to regulate the prices and quality of interstate drug traffic indirectly by promoting more
efficient use of drugs through HMOs. Finally, federal preemption might be justified under
Congress' power to tax and spend in furtherance of the general welfare, see Helvering v. Davis,
301 U.S. 619 (1937); Steward Mach. Co. v. Davis, 301 U.S. 548 (1937), by arguing that
preemption of restrictive state laws is necessary for ensuring that HMOs make efficient use
of other benefits they receive from the federal government, such as developmental subsidies
and improved access to employee markets. Cf. Havighurst, HMOs, supra note 5, at 783. The
insurance argument seems the most persuasive but it will be weakened in any particular case
to the extent that a court categorizes HMOs as providers rather than insurers. Such categori-
zation would be inappropriate, we believe, in view of the sui generis nature of HMOs as both
providers and insurers. See text accompanying notes 2-4 supra.
242. Only 5 states have mandated an HMO option of some form for their public employ-
ees. IOWA CODE ANN. § 514B.21 (Supp. 1976); N.J. STAT. ANN. § 26.2J-29 (Supp. 1976); PA.
STAT. ANN. tit. 40, § 1568 (Supp. 1976); UTAH CODE ANN. § 31-42-32 (1974); WASH. REv. CODE
ANN. § 48.46.180 (Supp. 1976).
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lation is one in which the federal government may be constitution-
ally unable to act after National League of Cities v. Usery,243 in
which the Supreme Court held that the commerce power does not
authorize application of the minimum wage and overtime provisions
of the Fair Labor Standards Act to most operations of state and
local governments.2 14 It is not clear that this decision would forbid
a federal mandate to state and local governments to include, at no
extra cost, an HMO option in any health benefits plan offered to
employees, but the decision clearly does raise some question about
the constitutionality of such a mandate.245 In any event, National
League of Cities had an immediate although incidental effect on
HMO law. By declaring the federal minimum wage law inapplicable
to most state and local government operations, this decision effec-
tively exempted state and local governments from the Federal HMO
Act's requirement that employers subject to the minimum wage
provisions of the Fair Labor Standards Act must, under certain
conditions, offer an HMO option to their employees as part of any
health benefits plan.21
243. 96 S. Ct. 2465 (1976).
244. Id. at 2472, 2476.
245. National League of Cities was decided by a 5-4 vote. The Court's apparent ration-
ale was that states' power to determine wages is essential to the separate and independent
existence of the states within a federal system, see id. at 2471, and that the minimum wage
and overtime requirements imposed by Congress would impair states' ability to function
effectively within that system, see id. at 2472-74. Moreover, in his concurring opinion Justice
Blackmun interpreted the Court's position as calling for a balancing of the federal interest
in regulation under the commerce clause with the states' interest in functioning indepen-
dently. Id. at 2476 (Blackmun, J., concurring). Certainly any decision by an employer about
health benefits to be offered to employees is an integral part of the larger decision about
employee compensation, and thus National League of Cities carries the implication that a
federal mandate of an HMO option upon state and local governments would be impermissible
under the commerce clause. On the other hand, mandating that state and local governments
offer an HMO option to their employees need not increase government costs, see text accom-
panying note 333 infra, and therefore would not seem to impair states' ability to "function
effectively" within the federal system. Furthermore, an analogy may be drawn to some extent
between the mandate of an HMO option, which need not increase government costs, and in
the long run might reduce them, and federal imposition of maximum wage controls on state
and local governments, which was upheld in Fry v. United States, 421 U.S. 542 (1975), and
explicitly distinguished in National League of Cities, 96 S. Ct. at 2472-75, on grounds that
the decision to impose federal wage controls included consideration of the federal govern-
ment's need to address the "extremely serious" national problem of inflation and the fact that
maximum wage controls would "reduce the pressures upon state budgets rather than increase
them." Id.
246. See text accompanying notes 331-47 infra. Notwithstanding the constitutional
question raised by National League of Cities, the 1976 HMO Amendments attempt to remedy
that decision's side effect and avoid its implications. See text accompanying notes 352-55
infra.
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A. The Federal HMO Act
This Act establishes a large number of qualifying conditions247
and provides three kinds of benefits for a qualified HMO: preemp-
tion of certain state laws that may restrict HMO development,24
certain developmental subsidies, 49 and improved access to the mar-
ket in group health insurance plans.2° The Act's qualifying condi-
tions are intended to ensure that federally certified HMOs provide
high quality care in an efficient manner and carry out certain distri-
butional reforms.25' These conditions clearly are designed to imple-
ment the quality utopians' approach to HMOs, and many of these
conditions appear overly restrictive, 25 2 although as noted below the
1976 HMO Amendments would make some liberalizing changes in
these conditions. To be sure, the quality utopians' original proposals
provided for substantial federal subsidies that might have allowed
qualified HMOs to meet these conditions without pricing them-
selves out of health insurance markets. In the ensuing political pro-
cess, however, the money largely was taken out and the qualifying
conditions remained. 253
(1) Quality Improvement and Quality Control Conditions
The Act and regulations thereunder establish three quality of
care conditions that appear likely to impose unwarranted costs and
unduly restrict HMO development under the Act. First, the policies
of a qualified HMO must cover a broad range of services, including
many that are not covered by existing HMOs. 254 A qualified HMO
247. 42 U.S.C. §§ 300e, 300e-1 (Supp. V, 1975).
248. Id. § 300e-10.
249. Id. §§ 300e-2 to -8.
250. Id. § 300e-9.
251. See SENATE HMO REPORT I, supra note 5, at 2-18.
252. For other discussions of the extremely stringent nature of the Act's qualifying
conditions, see IOM REPORT, supra note 1; McNeil & Schlenker, supra note 9, at 202-07;
Schneider & Stem, supra note 13, at 103-05. Evidence of the Act's restrictive nature is
provided by the low number of existing HMOs that have qualified to date. As of July 1, 1975,
only 5 very new HMOs with a total enrollment of 5,591 persons had qualified, HEW ANNUAL
REPORT, supra note 7, at 3-4, and as of July 1, 1976, a total of only 18 HMOs had qualified.
Telephone interview with Peter Kirsch, Public Health Advisor, HMO Program, Public
Health Service, HEW, West Hyattsville, Md., July 22, 1976 [hereinafter cited as Kirsch
interview].
253. The political history of the Act and the events causing this combination of strict
requirements and few subsidies are summarized by Rosoff, supra note 13, at 212-14.
254. The breadth of the Act's insurance coverage requirements and consequent expan-
sion of coverage and extra costs that are involved are one of 2 major reasons given by many
existing HMOs for their unwillingness or inability to qualify under the Act. McNeil &
Schlenker, supra note 9, at 216-17; see N.Y. Times, Feb. 14, 1974, at 30, col. 3; Wall Street
J., Feb. 11, 1975, at 1, col. 1.
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must offer a "basic health service" policy, 5' and basic health serv-
ices are defined to include not only physician, hospital inpatient,
and hospital outpatient services, but also short-term mental evalua-
tions and crisis intervention, treatment and referrals for the abuse
of or addiction to alcohol and drugs, home health services, and
preventive services (including family planning, preventive child
dental care, and children's eye examinations).28 In addition, a qual-
ified HMO may charge its subscribers only "nominal" copayments
for the provision of specific services as authorized by regulation."5 '
The Act's regulations limit HMO copayments to no more than fifty
percent of the cost of any specific service and, in the aggregate, to
no more than twenty percent of the total cost of providing all basic
health services. 2 s Furthermore, no copayment may be charged any
subscriber after his or her copayments in any year equal fifty per-
cent of the annual premium.59
A qualified HMO also must provide subscribers with the oppor-
tunity to purchase certain "supplemental health services" to the
extent that "required health manpower are available in the area
served by the organization," and these services may be offered on
either a prepaid or fee-for-service basis.260 Supplemental services
include intermediate and long-term (nursing home) care, long-term
physical medicine and rehabilitative care, and vision, dental, and
mental health services not covered by the basic policy.21' One sig-
nificant supplemental service is "prescription drugs prescribed in
the course of the provision . . . of a basic health service or [supple-
mental] service. ' 2 2 This somewhat ambiguous provision (does
"prescribed" include drugs that are "dispensed" to inpatients) is
clarified by the Act's regulations, which provide that drugs and
medicines for inpatient care must be covered by the basic policy, 263
but that other drugs, including those incidental to basic ambula-
tory services, only need be offered as a supplemental service.2 4
These very comprehensive coverage requirements seem to be
255. 42 U.S.C. § 300e(b)(1) (Supp. V, 1975).
256. Id. § 300e-1(1).
257. Id. § 300e(b)(1)(D).
258. 42 C.F.R. § 110.105(a)(4)(i) (1975).
259. Id. § 110.105(a)(4)(ii). This regulation has been criticized by existing HMOs as
unauthorized by the Act or its legislative history and as likely to add substantial costs to
HMO operations. Rosoff, supra note 13, at 224-25.
260. 42 U.S.C. § 300e(b) (Supp. V, 1975).
261. Id. § 300e-1(2).
262. Id. § 300e-1(2)(F).
263. 42 C.F.R. § 110.102(a)(2), (b)(4) (1975).
264. Id. § 110.103(a)(vi).
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based on two largely unexamined premises. The first is that con-
sumers will improve their health status substantially if they obtain
expanded insurance coverage in the form contemplated by the Act.
The second is that provision of such comprehensive services will
help reduce total medical expenditures by encouraging greater use
of less expensive outpatient and preventive services. '65 There ap-
pears to be little evidence to support either of these propositions in
full.26 ' The unfortunate effect of the Act's sweeping coverage re-
quirements will be to limit the number of HMOs that qualify, with-
out obtaining commensurate benefits in terms of substantially im-
proved quality or reduced costs. The 1976 HMO Amendments go
part way towards meeting this objection by changing preventive
child dental care from a basic to supplemental service,'6 and by
repealing the requirement that HMOs must offer supplemental
services. 28 Although these changes would remove one quite costly
service from the required basic policy,29 and relieve HMOs of the
burden of having to provide the numerous supplemental services,
they still would not provide maximum competitive flexibility for
HMOs desiring to qualify for federal benefits. Moreover, the repeal
of the requirement that HMOs must offer supplemental services,
which include outpatient drug services, substantially weakens one
of the few attractive features of the Act's coverage requirements.
These requirements attempt to implement two desirable re-
forms in a somewhat halting fashion. We have argued that HMOs
should be required to provide full maternity and well-child care and
full drug coverage on a prepaid basis because attachment of such
conditions to the HMO may be the only practical way to implement
these reforms on a general basis. 20 The Act's requirement that a
broad range of physician, outpatient, and preventive services be
covered by the basic policy appears to ensure that full prenatal and
post-natal care for new mothers and well-child care for infants will
be provided by qualified HMOs. 21 The Act also requires that inpa-
tient drugs be covered and that coverage of other drugs be offered
265. See SENATE HMO REPORT I, supra note 5, at 10-14.
266. See text accompanying notes 70-71 & 186 supra.
267. CONFERENCE REPORT, supra note 235, at 3-4, §§ 104(a)(1)-(b)(1).
268. Id. at 1-2, § 101(b).
269. See S. REP. No. 844, 94th Cong., 2d Sess. 7, 14 (1976). [hereinafter cited as SENATE
HMO REPORT I].
270. See text accompanying notes 224-31 supra.
271. See 42 U.S.C. § 300e-1(1) (Supp. V, 1975); 42 C.F.R. § 110.102(a) (1975). The 1976
HMO Amendments would include well-child care explicitly within the definition of basic
preventive services. CONFERENCE REPORT, supra note 235, at 3-4, § 104(a)(1).
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to subscribers on an optional basis.2 12 Although it would be prefera-
ble if all drugs incidental to any basic service were covered by the
basic policy and therefore covered on a prepaid basis, the Act at
least requires a qualified HMO to offer consumers the opportunity
to purchase all their drugs from the cost-conscious HMO. The 1976
HMO Amendments make supplemental services optional at the
choice of the HMO,273 and would leave qualified HMOs free to ig-
nore a substantial part of a patient's drug coverage.
Secondly, the Federal HMO Act also attempts to ensure quality
care by mandating two forms of consumer participation in the oper-
ation of qualified HMOs. Subscribers must constitute at least one-
third of the HMO's policymaking body,24 and the HMO must pro-
vide "meaningful procedures" for hearing and resolving consumer
grievances.2 These provisions are intended to make HMOs respon-
sive to consumer needs for nontechnical aspects of medical care,
such as convenience of service, range of available benefits, and the
nature of copayment requirements. 28 Notwithstanding their com-
mon purpose, the two provisions deserve separate analysis because
of potentially different effects. On the one hand, mandatory con-
sumer participation in HMO governance may deter nonconsumer-
oriented institutions from establishing HMOs that qualify for the
Act's benefits. 77 These institutions, in particular insurance compa-
nies, physicians, and profitmaking entities in general, are likely to
be the most available source of private capital for new HMOs,27 and
therefore this requirement may significantly retard the development
of qualified HMOs. Moreover, it is not clear why market competi-
tion between HMOs and other health insurers would not supply the
same kind of responsiveness to nontechnical consumer demands
that mandatory consumer governance is intended to provide.279 On
the other hand, mandatory grievance procedures seem likely to have
272. See notes 261-64 supra and accompanying text.
273. CONFERENCE REPORT, supra note 235, at 1-2, § 101(b).
274. 42 U.S.C. § 300e(c)(6) (Supp. V, 1975).
275. Id. § 300e(c)(7).
276. SENATE HMO REPORT I, supra note 5, at 16-17. See generally Schneider, supra note
13, at 272-74 n.20.
277. See generally Schneider, supra note 13, at 298-99.
278. Havighurst, HMOs, supra note 5, at 749-51; Schneider, supra note 13, at 299-301.
279. See IOM REPORT, supra note 1, at 48. Schneider argues that competition in "the
health care market" cannot be relied upon to enforce consumer interests because of many
existing market imperfections. Schneider, supra note 13, at 275. The imperfections he de-
scribes, however, are those of provider markets, not markets for health insurance, see id., and
in other parts of his article he places reliance upon increased competition among health
insurers as a means of promoting HMOs, see, e.g., id. at 284-90. See also text accompanying
notes 108-12 supra.
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less of an adverse impact upon creation or expansion of HMOs.
Also, they might serve as a useful deterrent to underservice and
other forms of inferior quality care, 20 even though many of these
questions may be of a technical nature. If consumers and providers
are aware of a forum in which consumer grievances may be dis-
cussed, providers should have additional incentive to practice qual-
ity medicine and be more open with consumers in order to avoid
complaints.
Thirdly, the Act requires that qualified HMOs establish an
"ongoing quality assurance program" in accordance with HEW reg-
ulations." ' This seems to be a reasonable delegation of the responsi-
bility to guard against the risk of underservice by qualified HMOs,
but the regulations implement this provision in a potentially ad-
verse way. An HMO's quality assurance program must be designed
in a manner that is "likely to meet the standards established" by
Professional Standards Review Organizations (PSROs).212 These
organizations are physician organizations designated by HEW to
monitor federally funded health services, including those furnished
by HMOs, for the purpose of controlling costs and ensuring ade-
quate quality. 23 As the fair market theorists have demonstrated,
PSRO regulation of HMOs for cost control purposes is irrelevant
280. See IOM REPORT, supra note 1, at 60.
281. 42 U.S.C. § 300e(c)(8) (Supp. V, 1975).
282. 42 C.F.R. § 110.108(j)(4) (1975).
283. The PSRO law, 42 U.S.C. § 1320c (Supp. V, 1975), was designed primarily to
control the federal health services budget that is believed to be substantially inflated by the
lack of effective cost constraints on fee-for-service providers. Havighurst & Blumstein, supra
note 40, at 38-41. The law establishes regional organizations of physicians, the membership
of which must include a "substantial proportion" of all physicians in the area, 42 U.S.C. §
1320c-l(b)(1)(A)(iii) (Supp. V, 1975), and must be "voluntary and open" to all licensed
physicians practicing in the area. Id. § 1320c-l(b)(1)(A)(v). These PSROs are generally
mandated to monitor all federally funded health services to ensure that these services are
medically necessary, provided in the most economical manner, and of sufficient quality to
meet "professionally recognized standards of health care," id. § 1320c-4(a)(1). They also are
authorized to monitor these services by such methods as case-by-case review, id. § 1320c-
4(a)(2), the maintenance and review of provider and patient "profiles of care and services,"
id. § 1320c-4(a)(4), and the establishment of "professionally developed norms of care, diagno-
sis, and treatment based upon typical patterns of practice" in the PSRO's region. Id. § 1320c-
5(a). Notwithstanding the statute's primary focus on controlling costs, the professional bias
of physicians toward providing the highest possible quality care, Havighurst & Blumstein,
supra note 38, at 20-30, HEW's postenactment interpretation of the laws, id. at 41-45, and
the fact that PSROs themselves will have no incentive to reduce health care costs other than
a most general statutory mandate, id. at 53, all appear to guarantee that PSROs generally
will emphasize quality of care regulation and place little emphasis on cost controls. This type
of regulation in the hands of HMOs' competitors seems very likely to raise substantial barriers
to cost effective performance by HMOs. See Havighurst & Bovbjerg, supra note 13, at 389-
411. See generally Havighurst & Blumstein, supra note 38.
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because of HMOs' already strong incentive to economize."' More
significantly, PSRO regulation of HMOs for quality control pur-
poses is likely to raise HMO costs unduly because PSRO organiza-
tions will be dominated by competing fee-for-service physicians and
because PSROs are likely to establish standards that emphasize the
highest quality care possible without considering appropriate qual-
ity/cost trade-offs that are essential to an HMO's effective perform-
ance. 5 It may be argued that PSRO review of HMOs is precisely
the mechanism needed to guard against the possibility of underser-
vice. This ignores, however, the confused and incomplete state of
medical knowledge about how quality may be measured, and also
ignores the important fact that PSROs will be dominated by com-
petitors of HMOs. Thus HEW's extension of PSRO standards to
qualified HMOs generally seems ill-advised; it would be more ap-
propriate for HEW to establish its own HMO quality regulation
program .286
The Federal HMO Act and its regulations establish other qual-
ity control conditions that appear less objectionable in terms of
potential costs and may help HMOs improve or maintain their qual-
ity of care. HMO services must be provided "in a manner which
assures continuity. ' 287 The regulations define this to mean that
HMOs must provide each enrollee with a health professional who
has primary responsibility for "coordinating the member's health
care," and that HMOs must develop an adequate system for patient
recordkeeping. 288 We already have noted reasons for believing that
these practices may improve health care. 29 HMOs also must pro-
vide or arrange for continuing education of its health professional
staff.290 Although the effectiveness of continuing education is un-
proven 29' and the costs of this program could be substantial, this
requirement conceivably could help improve HMOs' quality if
HMOs experience difficulty in recruiting physicians and therefore
obtain relatively poorly qualified ones. The regulations merely re-
state the statutory provision and, sensibly, do not attempt to quan-
tify the amount of continuing education that must be provided.22
284. Havighurst & Bovbjerg, supra note 13, at 393-98.
285. Id. at 389-411; see note 283 supra.
286. Havighurst & Bovbjerg, supra note 13, at 411-17.
287. 42 U.S.C. § 300e(b)(4) (Supp. V, 1975).
288. 42 C.F.R. § 110.107(c)(2) (1975).
289. See text accompanying notes 92-98 supra.
290. 42 U.S.C. § 300e(c)(10) (Supp. V, 1975).
291. See note 99 supra.
292. See 42 C.F.R. § 110.108(1) (1975).
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Finally, HMOs must compile, evaluate, and report to HEW statis-
tics relating to service utilization by its members. 93 Utilization sta-
tistics, which can be compared with service utilization patterns of
populations that are comparable to the HMO's members, would
seem to be particularly useful for detecting at least gross cases of
overeconomizing and underservice by HMOs. 94
(2) Distributional Reform Conditions
The Federal HMO Act establishes several conditions to ensure
that qualified HMOs engage in distributional reforms, that is, activ-
ities that redistribute resources from certain groups of subscribers
to others. Initially, the Act requires that qualified HMOs fix prepay-
ments for basic health services and any prepayments for supple-
mental services on a community rating system.295 The Act also re-
quires that qualified HMOs conduct annual open enrollment peri-
ods of at least thirty days, during which individual subscribers must
be accepted in the order in which they apply without regard to their
health status or health care needs..2 An open enrollment period may
be waived by HEW for reasons of economic viability,297 limited ca-
pacity,28 or impairment of an HMO's capacity to satisfy the Act's
subscriber population requirements that are described below.299 The
1976 HMO Amendments would make two significant changes in
these requirements. Imposition of the community rating require-
ment would be delayed for four years after qualification under the
Act for any HMO that was providing services prior to qualifica-
tion."°0 More significantly, the 1976 HMO Amendments would
amend the open enrollment requirement substantially, retaining
293. 42 U.S.C. § 300e(c)(1l)(B) (Supp. V, 1975).
294. IOM REPORT, supra note 1, at 58-59.
295. 42 U.S.C. § 300e(b)(1)-(2) (Supp. V, 1975). A community rate is in essence a single
rate for all subscribers that eliminates rate differentials based on varying health status and
cost experience of different groups. The Act does allow HMO rates to reflect different admin-
istrative costs of collecting payments from different groups, id., § 300e-1(a)(A), and it also
allows HMOs to charge different rates for subscribers whose premiums are paid by Medicare
and Medicaid. Id., § 300e-l(8)(B).
296. Id. § 300e(c)(4).
297. Id. § 300e(c)(4)(A). A waiver of open enrollment may be granted if the HMO would
otherwise obtain a disproportionate number of high-risk subscribers sufficient to jeopardize
its "economic viability." Regulations define the concept of economic viability to include, but
not be limited to, "an increase in rates which would make the [HMO] noncompetitive in
its area." 42 C.F.R. § 110.108(d)(1) (1975).
298. 42 C.F.R. § 110.108(d)(1) (1975).
299. Id. § 110.108(d)(2). The Act's subscriber population requirements are discussed in
the text accompanying notes 307-15 infra.
300. CONFERENCE REPORT, supra note 235, at 4, § 105(a).
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only a quite limited form of this requirement for relatively mature
and growing HMOs."'
The purpose of community rating and open enrollment require-
ments is to preclude qualified HMOs from employing "experience
rating" for different groups and "skimming practices" that result in
higher rates or total unavailability of health insurance for relatively
high-risk individuals °.3 2 The provision of adequate health services
for high-risk individuals who are unable to afford them certainly
seems to be an appropriate social goal. From the standpoint of eco-
nomic welfare theory, the most efficient way to do this is to provide
direct subsidies to such individuals. The alternative use of com-
munity rating and open enrollments to achieve this goal in effect
taxes low-risk subscribers to subsidize high-risk persons; this may
cause low-risk subscribers to purchase less health insurance than
they should and high-risk subscribers to purchase too much.3
Nonetheless, if adequate public subsidization of health services for
high-risk individuals is not politically feasible, the indirect ap-
proach of attaching this reform to HMOs may appear desirable. The
major problem with this use of the reformmongering technique is
that both requirements (particularly if taken together) appear likely
to diminish substantially the competitive position of qualified
HMOs vis-a-vis other health insurers, who remain free to employ
experience rating and skimming practices. One HMO experienced
fifty percent higher costs for subscribers joining during open enroll-
ment,0 4 and others have experienced utilization increases of thirty-
five to 140 percent from such subscribers. 5 Such data suggest
strongly that community rating and open enrollment requirements
together will price HMOs out of the health insurance market.3 8 A
301. Id. at 3, § 103. The open enrollment requirement would apply only to an HMO
(1) that has been in existence 5 years, or has an enrollment of 50,000 subscribers, and (2) that
has not incurred a financial deficit in its most recent fiscal year. Furthermore, such an HMO
could close its open enrollment after taking 3% of its net increase in enrollment during the
preceding year exclusive of increases under existing group contracts.
302. SENATE HMO REPORT I, supra note 5, at 6; see text accompanying notes 136-39
supra.
303. See Pauly, The Welfare Economics of Community Rating, 37 J. RiSK INs. 407
(1970).
304. McNeil & Schlenker, supra note 9, at 217-18.
305. SENATE HMO REPORT II, supra note 269, at 9.
306. These requirements are the second reason given by existing HMOs for their unwill-
ingness or inability to qualify under the Federal HMO Act. See id. at 6; McNeil & Schlenker,
supra note 9, at 217-18; Schneider & Stem, supra note 13, at 104 n.65. But cf. SENATE HMO
REPORT II, supra note 269, at 31-32, where Senators Kennedy, Nelson, and Hathaway cite the
Marshfield Clinic HMO's 5-year experience with open enrollment to support opposition to
any weakening of the Act's open enrollment requirement. This HMO estimates that its
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community rating requirement alone would appear less objection-
able, but it still might prevent HMOs from competing for particular
employee groups by offering experience rates that are closer to those
offered by other insurers. An open enrollment requirement alone
also would appear less objectionable, since HMOs could employ
special open enrollment rates to cover the costs of serving this group
of enrollees. Either requirement alone, however, would largely de-
feat the cross-subsidization purpose of the two requirements taken
together. Finally, the proposed amendment to limit the open enroll-
ment requirement to relatively mature and expanding HMOs would
seem to penalize unfairly those HMOs and their subscribers. Moreo-
ver, under this amendment the ability and incentive of relatively
successful HMOs to continue expanding would be diminished, and
these HMOs may be the best source of future HMO development.
The Act also requires qualified HMOs to enroll persons who are
"broadly representative" of the population within the area it serv-
ices, "7 although HMOs serving nonrural areas are limited to no
more than seventy-five percent membership from "medically un-
derserved populations. '" 38 The representative population provision
originally was intended as a weaker alternative to the open enroll-
ment requirement, " ' although both provisions remained in the Act.
This provision has not been further defined by regulation,310 and it
would seem to be somewhat superfluous in conjunction with the
open enrollment provision and subject to similar objections. None-
theless, it might serve as a useful moral and regulatory adjuration
for some qualified HMOs to seek out Medicare and Medicaid bene-
ficiaries in their areas. The real effectiveness of this search, however,
will depend on the adequacy of HMO payments under these pro-
grams, a problem discussed in a later section. " The limitation on
premium for all subscribers increased only 8% above what it would have been without open
enrollment. The Senators call this a "small increase," but it is unclear why an 8% increase
in an annual insurance premium of several hundred dollars may not substantially disadvan-
tage a truly competitive HMO.
307. 42 U.S.C. § 300e(c)(3) (Supp. V, 1975).
308. Id. Medically underserved populations may be either populations of areas with a
shortage of health services or population groups with a shortage of services. These populations
are to be designated by HEW after consultation with official state health planning agencies.
Id. § 300e-1(7). Regulations provide that these designations will be made on an ad hoc basis
in connection with applications by HMOs for qualifications. 42 C.F.R. § 110.203(g) (1975).
309. See S. REP. No. 621, 93d Cong., 1st Sess. 37 (1973).
310. See 42 C.F.R. § 110.108(c) (1975).
311. See text accompanying notes 407-59 infra. Any attempt by HEW to use the repre-
sentative population requirement to force qualified HMOs to enroll Medicare and Medicaid
beneficiaries despite inadequate payments to HMOs for such services would be subject to the
same objections raised above about the open enrollment requirement.
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enrollments from medically underserved populations is designed to
encourage nonrural HMOs serving low income areas to recruit a
substantial proportion of their subscribers from other areas. t 2 This
requirement may be viewed as an attempt to guard against under-
service by "poor people's" HMOs by ensuring that a substantial
number of nonpoor are enrolled in any qualified HMO." 3 This limi-
tation may not be waived by HEW, " and as noted earlier the ab-
sence of a waiver provision may work to the disadvantage of the
urban poor if HMOs in their areas are unable to obtain twenty-five
percent membership from other areas or population groups. 15
(3) Cost Reform Conditions
The Federal HMO Act establishes two significant qualifying
conditions that are designed to ensure cost effective performance by
HMOs."' The first of these seems unnecessary and restrictive; the
second seems desirable, bui has been implemented by HEW in a
weak fashion. First, a qualified HMO must assume almost all the
financial risk involved in providing basic health services." ' Thus, for
example, an HMO that desires to assume financial risk only for
ambulatory or primary care services, while reinsuring its subscribers
for other covered services, 318 cannot qualify under the Federal HMO
Act. The purpose of the financial risk requirement is to ensure that
qualified HMOs face the fullest possible financial incentive to keep
costs down.319 While reinsurance may lift some immediate incentive
from HMOs to reduce costs,320 it is not clear why HMOs in competi-
tive markets would not have incentive to reduce costs of reinsured
services in order to keep the costs of reinsurance policies at a mini-
mum. These HMOs would have a similar incentive to narrow the
312. SENATE HMO REPORT I, supra note 5, at 18.
313. See text accompanying notes 213-17 supra.
314. See 42 U.S.C. § 300e(c)(3) (Supp. V, 1975).
315. See text accompanying notes 216 & 217 supra.
316. The Act's comprehensive coverage requirements may be viewed as a third condi-
tion designed to ensure cost effective performance, but it does not seem likely to achieve that
purpose. See text accompanying notes 67-71 supra.
317. 42 U.S.C. § 300e(c)(2) (Supp. V, 1975). Exceptions are allowed only for reinsurance
of (1) the cost of providing services to any subscriber in excess of $5,000 in any year, (2) the
cost of basic health services obtained by subscribers elsewhere because of emergencies or other
"medical necessities" (for example, out-of-town travel or work), and (3) not more than 90%
of losses in excess of 15% of annual income. Id.
318. For discussion of the myriad forms such HMOs might take and the role of reinsur-
ance in supporting these HMOs see Havighurst, HMOs, supra note 5, at 746-47, 790.
319. SENATE HMO REPORT I, supra note 5, at 14.
320. With reinsurance of costs for certain services, an HMO becomes in effect a con-
sumer or a provider, or both, of fee-for-service medicine for those services.
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range of reinsured services because of the relatively high cost of
reinsurance.3 2' The unfortunate effect of the Act's financial risk re-
quirement is to reduce the possibility that new and smaller HMOs
can qualify 212 Since the ostensible general purpose of the Act is to
promote HMO growth, it seems particularly unfortunate that new
HMOs cannot use substantial reinsurance to protect against risk, at
least during their initial years of operation . 23 Furthermore, although
small HMOs with substantial reinsurance may not be as cost effec-
tive as larger HMOs because of relatively high reinsurance costs,
smaller HMOs may offer higher quality care for which consumers
are willing to pay.32 4 If so, smaller HMOs would provide the quality
improvements and competitive stimulus to fee-for-service providers
that are expected from HMOs generally.
Secondly, the Act mandates that qualified closed-panel HMOs
utilize such additional professional personnel, allied health professions person-
nel, and other health personnel (as specified in regulations of the Secretary)
as are available and appropriate for the effective and efficient delivery of...
services .... 3
MCF-type HMOs are subject to a similar but weaker mandate to
utilize such personnel "to the extent feasible. '321 These provisions
appear to be an invitation to HEW to issue regulations that posi-
tively encourage HMOs to make maximum feasible use of expanded
medical delegation. Such regulations might include required sub-
mission of staffing patterns, annual reports on progress towards
expanded delegations, and professional and consumer education on
the use of physician's assistants and nurse practitioners. For the
reasons given above, 32 1 we think that such use of the reformmonger-
ing technique in HMO legislation is highly desirable. Unfortunately
HEW's regulations merely restate the very general language of the
statutory provisions.23 The opportunity to use the HMO as a vehicle
for promoting expanded medical delegation in the American medi-
cal economy apparently has not been seized.32 9
321. IOM REPORT, supra note 1, at 46.
322. Id. at 45-46. Existing HMOs apparently have not complained much about this
requirement, see note 254 supra, but well-established HMOs tend to have the capacity to
satisfy this requirement.
323. For a discussion of the business risks involved in starting new HMOs see Harvard
HMO Note, supra note 13, at 949-54.
324. See text accompanying notes 207-08 supra.
325. 42 U.S.C. § 300e-l(4)(C)(iv) (Supp. V, 1975).
326. Id. § 300e-l(5)(B)(i).
327. See text accompanying notes 219-23 supra.
328. 42 C.F.R. §§ 110.101(i)(3)(iv), (j)ii)(A) (1975).
329. HEW might "goad" HMOs on expanded medical delegation in the course of ap-
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(4) Benefits for Qualified HMOs
The Federal HMO Act offers qualified HMOs the three general
kinds of government assistance to which all or most HMO theorists
apparently would agree: improved access to group insurance mar-
kets; preemption of certain unfairly restrictive state laws; and de-
velopmental subsidies. The Act and HEW's regulations thereunder
may be criticized for not going far enough in each of these areas, but
even so, the Act's benefits may be sufficient to attract HMOs de-
spite the apparently substantial extra costs involved in meeting the
qualifying conditions.33
The Act requires that any employer who is subject to the mini-
mum wage requirements of the Fair Labor Standards Act (or would
be but for a specific exemption in section 13(a) of that Act331), who
employs at least twenty-five employees, and who offers health insur-
ance as a fringe benefit to its employees shall offer "to its employees
. ..the option of membership in qualified health maintenance or-
ganizations which are engaged in the provision of basic and supple-
mental health services in the areas in which such employees re-
side." ' No employer is required to pay more for health benefits by
reason of offering the HMO option, 3 and the employer's obligation
commences only after an HMO has been qualified by HEW334 and
has requested inclusion in the employer's health benefits plan.33 5
Two major issues of statutory interpretation and political contro-
versy have surrounded HEW's implementation of the mandatory
HMO option requirement.31 One issue is whether the Act requires
employers to offer employees the HMO option if the employees'
collective bargaining agent has first rejected the offer in negotia-
proving individual applications for qualification. The explicit reference to "regulations of the
Secretary" in the Act's provision regarding use of ancillary health personnel, however, would
seem to make this an unwise if not illegal practice.
330. See Schneider & Stem, supra note 13, at 104-05. The most significant benefit is
apparently the Act's mandate to many employers to offer employees the option of insurance
coverage by a qualified HMO. See id.; McNeil & Schlenker, supra note 9, at 216-17. The Act's
other benefits may be less important because new state HMO laws are doing away with the
legal restrictions at which the federal act is aimed, and because developmental subsidies have
not been made available in substantial amounts. See note 396 infra and accompanying text.
331. Section 13(a) of the Fair Labor Standards Act, 29 U.S.C. § 213(a) (Supp. V, 1975),
exempts a broad variety of employees, such as professionals and certain retail and agricul-
tural employees, from the minimum wage and overtime provisions of the Act.
332. 42 U.S.C. § 300e-9(a) (Supp. V, 1975).
333. Id. § 300e-9(c).
334. Id. § 300e-9(d).
335. 40 Fed. Reg. 50212 (1975).
336. See 40 Fed. Reg. 6602-03 (1975); 40 Fed. Reg. 50212 (1975); Rosoff, supra note 13,
at 229-34.
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tions with the employer.3 ' A literal reading of the provision, which
requires that the option be offered to "employees,""33 seems to re-
quire that such an offer be made. Furthermore, the Act's legislative
history reveals that Congress did intend the mandatory HMO op-
tion to have a dual purpose-improving HMOs' access to health
insurance markets and "providing individuals with additional alter-
natives from which to choose for their care." ' It appears, nonethe-
less, that Congress did not consider the role of collective bargaining
agents in this process, 340 which raises the question of the need to
balance the policy of promoting collective bargaining under the
National Labor Relations Act 34' with the Federal HMO Act's policy
of promoting HMO expansion. The final regulations, which were
adopted after considerable debate and exchange of views among
federal agencies and the private sector,32 provide that employers
need offer the HMO option only to the collective bargaining agent
of any organized employees, and that the agent may refuse the
option on behalf of the employees. 43 The 1976 HMO Amendments
would ratify this decision,344 and this accommodation of the two
conflicting federal policies is most likely a politically necessary
one. 5 This resolution, nonetheless, seems unfortunate in view of the
incentives that both employers and union leaders may have to avoid
offering an HMO option to employees. 346 Furthermore, one may
question whether the alternative disposition, direct offer of the
HMO option to all covered employees, would seriously damage the
overall federal policy of promoting collective bargaining, which
seems quite well established indeed.
The second issue is whether the HMO option provision applies
to the federal government, which together with state and local gov-
337. See 40 Fed. Reg. 50212 (1975).
338. 42'U.S.C. § 300e-9(a) (Supp. V, 1975).
339. H.R. REP. No. 451, 93d Cong., 1st Sess. 39 (1973).
340. See id. at 38-39.
341. 29 U.S.C. § 151 (1970).
342. See 40 Fed. Reg. 50212 (1975).
343. See id. at 50215. HEW's proposed regulations would have required employers to
offer the HMO option directly to employees, including those represented by collective bar-
gaining agents. 40 Fed. Reg. 6602-03 (1975).
344. H.R. REP. No. 9019, 94th Cong., 2d Sess. § 9(a)(2) (1976); SENATE HMO REPORT
II, supra note 269, at 54.
345. The report of the Senate Committee on Labor and Public Welfare on the 1976
HMO Amendments explains the proposed amendment to ratify HEW's final regulation sim-
ply as a clarification of congressional intent not to modify the rights of unions to bargain
collectively on behalf of their members with respect to health benefits. SENATE HMO REPORT
II, supra note 269, at 11.
346. These incentives are discussed in the text accompanying notes 159-61 supra.
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ernments became subject to the Fair Labor Standards Act by
amendment34 ' subsequent to enactment of the Federal HMO Act.
National League of Cities removed most state and local government
employers from coverage under the Fair Labor Standards Act's min-
imum wage requirements, and therefore from coverage under the
Federal HMO Act's option provision. The question remains, how-
ever, whether the failure of the Federal HMO Act to use the phrase
"as amended" in referring to the Fair Labor Standards Act prohib-
its application of the HMO option provision to the federal govern-
ment, and any other employers who may come under the Fair Labor
Standards Act by subsequent amendment.348 HEW assumed that
the failure to use the broader reference was merely a "technical
oversight" 349 and promulgated regulations that apply the mandatory
HMO option to the federal government and other such employers. 5
The 1976 HMO Amendments would ratify this regulation,35' and it
certainly is appropriate that-the federal government as an employer
undertake an obligation that it expects of most private employers.
The 1976 HMO Amendments also would deny certain federal
grants under the Public Health Service Act to any state that does
not arrange for inclusion of an HMO option (for federally qualified
HMOs) in health benefit plans offered to state and local government
employees. 52 The federal grants to which the HMO option would be
made a condition are those for public health services, communica-
ble and other disease control programs, family planning services,
and comprehensive health planning.5 3 This provision would reverse
National League of Cities' incidental exclusion of state and local
governments from the Federal HMO Act's option provision, 354 and,
by attaching the HMO option to the federal spending power, it
attempts to avoid the constitutional question whether a direct man-
date of an HMO option on state governments is authorized by the
commerce clause.3 55
As a matter of constitutional law, the federal government ap-
347. Fair Labor Standards Act § 3(d), 29 U.S.C. § 203(d) (Supp. V, 1975), formerly ch.
676, § 3(d), 52 Stat. 1060 (1938).
348. Rosoff, supra note 13, at 231 n.83.
349. Id. The Senate Labor and Public Welfare Committee has confirmed this position.
SENATE HMO REPORT 1I, supra note 269, at 21.
350. See 40 Fed. Reg. 50213 (1975).
351. CONFERENCE REPORT, supra note 235, at 8, § 110(b).
352. Id., at 7-8, § 110(a)(1).
353. Id.
354. See text accompanying notes 347-48 supra.
355. The question whether the commerce power authorizes a direct mandate of an HMO
option upon states is discussed at note 245 supra and accompanying text.
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parently may attach broad conditions to grants to state govern-
ments so long as the conditions reasonably are related to the pur-
pose of the spending. 56 Arguably, the expansion of HMOs under an
HMO option offered to state and local government employees will
promote the purposes of the grants to which the HMO option provi-
sion would be attached and therefore a "reasonable relationship"
test could be satisfied. A primary purpose of comprehensive health
planning is to promote more efficient health care, 57 and the promo-
tion of cost-effective HMOs may be viewed as helping to achieve
this purpose. Similarly, the somewhat greater emphasis placed by
HMOs on preventive care5 ' might help achieve the preventive care
purposes of the other grants to which the HMO option would be
attached. Nonetheless, these relationships between HMOs and the
grant programs seem rather indirect, 359 and the attachment of the
HMO option to these grants is a transparent attempt to avoid the
commerce clause question. In this situation, it appears possible, if
not probable, that the Court might give careful scrutiny to the rela-
tionship between the condition and the purpose of the spending, and
require in effect some form of "direct relationship" that would be
more difficult to satisfy than a mere "reasonable relationship. '"360
The Federal HMO Act expressly preempts the application of
three kinds of state laws to qualified HMOs. The first is any require-
ment that a medical society approve an HMO's organization, that
physicians sit on the HMO's governing body, or that participation
in the HMO be open to all or some given percentage of physicians
in the community.36 1 The second type is any requirement that
HMOs meet initial capitalization or financial reserve requirements
356. See Oklahoma v. United States Civil Service Comm'n, 330 U.S. 127, 142-44 (1947);
Steward Mach. Co. v. Davis, 301 U.S. 548, 593-94 (1937).
357. See text accompanying note 377 infra.
358. See text accompanying notes 82-85 supra.
359. In Oklahoma v. United States Civil Service Comm'n, 330 U.S. 127 (1947), the
Supreme Court upheld the federal government's requirement that employees of state agencies
receiving federal funds comply with the Hatch Act's prohibition of political activity by federal
government employees. This condition, it was held, was designed to ensure that federal
monies were administered properly at the state level and thus the condition was related to
the spending programs. Id. at 133-44. This requirement relating to the management of federal
money seems more directly related to federal spending than the HMO option provision of the
1976 HMO Amendments, which attempts to construct a more favorable health care environ-
ment within which the grant program operates.
360. In this regard, note that the majority in National League of Cities expressly re-
served decision without giving an opinion on the question whether the federal government
could impose minimum wage and overtime requirements on state governments under the
federal spending power even though this could not be done under the commerce clause. 96
S. Ct. 2465, 2474 n.17. See also, id. at 2487 (Brennan, J., dissenting).
361. 42 U.S.C. §§ 300e-10(a)(1)(A)-(C) (Supp. V, 1975).
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established for health care insurers generally.32 The third kind of
state law preempted by the Act is any prohibition against an HMO's
advertising "its services, charges, or other nonprofessional aspects
of its operation," although this does not authorize "advertising
which identifies, refers to, or makes any qualitative judgment con-
cerning any health professional who provides services for a health
maintenance organization. ' 6 3 By implication the Act also preempts
the application to qualified HMOs of the common law rule against
the corporate practice of medicine .3  These provisions are desirable
for reasons given above,365 but they do not go far enough in two
respects. First, because of consumer inertia to this new form of
practice, HMOs may find it extremely useful to provide potential
subscribers with information about the quality of care they ren-
der.366 The Act's preemption provisions do not protect such advertis-
ing from the very common state restrictions against advertising by
physicians.3 11 Secondly, the Act does not free qualified HMOs from
state licensure laws that may keep HMOs from engaging in the
maximum feasible amount of expanded medical delegation. Be-
cause such restrictions continue to be plentiful, 38 federal preemp-
tion of these restrictions would seem to be a necessary concomitant
to the Act's requirement that qualified HMOs make effective use of
ancillary health personnel.369
By analogy to arguments supporting preemption of restrictive
state laws, the Federal HMO Act also should exempt HMOs from
any general federal health care regulations that unfairly restrict
HMO development and performance. We have noted the potential
problem for HMOs that has been created by the PSRO law.370 An-
other potentially significant obstacle to HMO development is pre-
sented by the certificate-of-need provisions of the Health Planning
and Resources Development Act. 7 ' This Act in effect mandates
362. Id. § 300e-10(a)(1)(D).
363. Id. § 300e-10(b).
364. See IOM REPORT, supra note 1, at 21-23. The Act's preemption provisions do not
mention the corporate practice rule, see 42 U.S.C. § 300e-10 (Supp. V, 1975), but any
application of this rule to forbid operation of a qualified HMO would so directly conflict with
the Act that preemption would seem to be a certainty. See Holley & Carlson, supra note 5,
at 677-81.
365. See notes 142-46 supra and accompanying text.
366. IOM REPORT, supra note 1, at 42-43.
367. Id.
368. See text accompanying notes 55-59 supra.
369. See IOM REPORT, supra note 1, at 28-29.
370. See notes 283-86 supra and accompanying text.
371. 42 U.S.C. § 300k (Supp. V, 1975). Provisions of this Act that apply to certificate-
of-need regulation are scattered throughout, but the main provisions are id. §§ 300m-
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states to establish certificate-of-need regulations to control entry by
institutional health providers into the health care market on the
basis of the public need for health services.372 Institutional providers
are defined to include inpatient facilities, ambulatory surgical cen-
ters, and HMOs;37 this definition subjects new ambulatory facilities
of HMOs, but not new fee-for-service medical clinics, to certificate-
of-need controls, an unequal and apparently unfair provision 74 that
can only be explained by the unwillingness of Congress to regulate
the opening of all new physician offices.375 Perhaps a more signifi-
cant problem for HMO development lies with this Act's complex
regulatory structure, which promises to give fee-for-service provi-
ders substantial influence over the development of local certificate-
of-need criteria and individual decisions.376
The purpose of certificate-of-need regulation is to eliminate
wasteful and duplicative expansion of health care facilities and
2(a)(4)(B) and (b)(2). For an analysis of state certificate-of-need laws that existed prior to
this Act see Havighurst, Certificate of Need Regulation, supra note 211.
372. Although certificate-of-need regulations are to be implemented by "agreements"
between HEW and state governors, 42 U.S.C. §§ 300m, 300m-2(a)(4)(B) (Supp. V, 1975),
states will lose substantial federal health funds if they do not establish certificate-of-need
regulations by Sept. 30, 1980. Id. § 300m(d).
373. Section 1531(5) of the Act, 42 U.S.C. § 300n(5) (Supp. V, 1975), defines institu-
tional health services to include HMOs and "health care facilities" as defined in existing
Social Security Act regulations. 42 C.F.R. § 100.102(e) (1975). These regulations limit the
definition of health care facilities to inpatient facilities, freestanding hemodialysis units, and
ambulatory surgical centers. Id.
374. See SENATE HMO REPORT II, supra note 269, at 27. The Senate's version of the 1976
HMO Amendments would have exempted HMO ambulatory facilities from certificate-of-
need regulations, S. 1926, § 16(a), but this provision was not adopted by the conference
committee on the theory that this change should be considered in the context of a later
revision of the certificate-of-need law. CONFERENaCE REPORT, supra note 235, at 36.
375. Any attempt to distinguish between "ambulatory medical clinics" and "physi-
cians' offices" is essentially arbitrary since both function in the same way. Thus in establish-
ing the scope of certificate-of-need jurisdiction under the Health Planning and Resources
Development Act, 42 U.S.C. § 300k (Supp. V, 1975), Congress was faced with a choice of
regulating all or none of HMOs' ambulatory service competitors.
376. See Havighurst, Certificate of Need Regulation, supra note 211, at 1185. Under this
Act the public need for any new institutional health service is to be determined through a
rather complex and costly process. Final determinations of need are to be made by a state
health planning agency, 42 U.S.C. §§ 300m-2(a)(4)(B), (c) (Supp. V, 1975), but only after
general planning for health services has been undertaken, and a specific recommendation on
the proposed new service has been made by the appropriate regional health systems agency
(HSA). Id. (For details of the natuie of the planning and review functions of HSAs see id. §
3001-2.) HSAs may be nonprofit private corporations, public regional planning bodies, or a
unit of local government if the government's jurisdiction is coextensive with the designated
health planning area, but any HSA must have a governing body of which at least a majority
are consumers and 1/3 are providers. Id. § 3001-1(b). Consumers, who generally have neither
the resources nor the expertise of providers, seem unlikely to be a strong counter-force to
providers. Cf. Havighurst, Certificate of Need Regulation, supra note 211, at 1185.
19761 1219
VANDERBILT LAW REVIEW [Vol. 29:1163
services that seems to result from the easy availability of health
insurance to cover fee-for-service payments and the generally weak
market constraints on health care providers.3 7 Although in some
cases HMO entry into an oversupplied market might increase the
supply of services and areawide health care costs on a permanent
basis,7 8 it would seem on balance that HMOs' interest in and ability
to introduce more efficient health care,7 9 and the real danger that
HMOs will be unfairly excluded by the certificate-of-need process, 30
justify exempting HMOs from this type of regulation. 3 1 The Health
Planning and Resources Development Act gives limited recognition
to these arguments by providing that certificate-of-need criteria
"shall include consideration of . . . [t]he special needs and cir-
cumstances of [HMOs] for which assistance may be provided"
under the Federal HMO Act.38 2 This provision seems inadequate,
however, because it grants special consideration only for HMOs that
qualify under the Federal HMO Act.3 3 It also is difficult to imagine
how any effective special consideration may be given to HMO en-
trants that falls short of either special federal review of unfavorable
HMO certificate-of-need decisions,384 or total exemption of HMOs
377. Havighurst, Certificate of Need Regulation, supra note 211, at 1155-69; see text
accompanying notes 38-39 supra. The perverse nature of medical economics is such that
increased supply does not necessarily reduce prices because suppliers can generate new de-
mand and can exercise substantial market power to raise prices on an inelastic demand
schedule. An increase in supply may even result in increased prices if each of a larger number
of suppliers attempts to maintain a given income while providing fewer services.
378. This might happen, for example, if the HMO was controlled by existing providers
and was introduced as a defensive measure to keep truly competitive HMOs out of the
market. See generally Havighurst, HMOs, supra note 5, at 759-77. Another theoretical possi-
bility is that the HMO's substitution of ambulatory care for inpatient care would leave
hospital beds vacant and invite their overutilization by other providers. IOM REPORT, supra
note 1, at 27.
379. HMOs' interest in and ability to introduce more efficient services make it likely
that short run supply increases from HMO entry, which may appear wasteful, will in the long
run be efficient as higher cost providers drop out of the market or reduce their scale of
operations.
380. Unfair exclusions of HMOs may occur from domination of the certificate-of-need
process by fee-for-service providers, see note 376 supra and accompanying text, from failure
to give adequate consideration to HMOs' long run efficiencies, see note 379 supra, or simply
from the costs of going through the regulatory process, see note 376 supra, which costs will
bear more heavily on HMOs than other providers to the extent that the HMO sector continues
to grow.
381. See IOM REPORT, supra note 1, at 25-28; Havighurst, Certificate of Need
Regulation, supra note 211, at 1207-15.
382. 42 U.S.C. § 300n-1(c)(8) (Supp. V, 1975).
383. The provision seems to apply to all federally qualified HMOs, even those that do
not obtain developmental subsidies, since it applies to HMOs for which assistance "may" be
provided under the Federal HMO Act. Id.
384. The Health Planning and Resources Development Act does not provide for federal
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from the regulatory process. For example, HEW's proposed
certificate-of-need regulations under the Health Planning and Re-
sources Development Act merely restate the statutory provision.
385
HMOs already have experienced some difficulty in obtaining
certificates-of-need under prior state laws, 388 and it appears now
that the federal certificate-of-need law will increase the barriers to
HMO development.3 7
The third benefit offered by the Federal HMO Act to qualified
HMOs is the possibility of obtaining developmental subsidies. The
Act authorizes HEW to make grants and loans to qualified public
and nonprofit HMOs and to guarantee loans made to qualified prof-
itmaking HMOs serving medically underserved populations in order
to help cover a variety of developmental costs. 38 Certain priorities
are established for HMOs proposing to serve rural areas8 ' or medi-
cally underserved populations .3  The Act authorized to be appropri-
ated for these purposes seemingly substantial sums for the four
years ending June 30, 1977.11' One perceived problem is the Act's
failure to authorize loan guarantees for nonprofit HMOs, 92 a failure
review of certificate-of-need determinations. See id. § 300m-2.
385. 41 Fed. Reg. 11704 (1976).
386. IOM REPORT, supra note 1, at 26; see McNeil & Schlenker, supra note 9, at 209.
387. The 1976 HMO Amendments would amend the special consideration provision of
the Health Planning and Resources Development Act, 42 U.S.C. § 300n-1(c)(8) (Supp. V,
1975), to provide that the criteria established by state agencies under this provision shall be
"consistent" with the standards and procedures established by HEW for comments from
state health planning agencies on grants to HMOs under the Federal HMO Act. CONFERENCE
REPORT, supra note 235, at 11, § 117(a). These latter standards and procedures, however, do
little more than require consideration of a broad range of factors in addressing the public need
question. See 42 C.F.R. § 110.204 (1975). This amendment might have the mildly beneficial
effect of educating state certificate-of-need agencies on the special characteristics of HMOs,
but it seems designed to do nothing more. See SENATE HMO REPORT II, supra note 269, at
27.
388. 42 U.S.C. §§ 300e-2 to -4 (Supp. V, 1975). These sections authorize HEW to make
grants to public and nonprofit private entities for feasibility studies, planning, and initial
development costs, id. §§ 300e-2, -3; to make loans to such entities to cover operating losses
during the first three years of operation, id. § 300e-4; and to guarantee non-federal loans made
to a profit-making entity proposing to serve a medically underserved population for the
purposes of covering planning, initial development costs, or operating losses during the first
three years, id. §§ 300e-3, -4.
389. Id. §§ 300e-2(i), -3(k), -4(e). HMOs proposing to serve nonmetropolitan areas are
to be given a "first crack" at 20% of the funds obligated under each section.
390. Id. §§ 300e-2(c), -3(d). These sections provide that HEW shall give priority to
applications from HMOs proposing to enroll at least 30% of their members from medically
underserved populations. The limitation of loan guarantees to profitmaking HMOs serving
such populations, id. §§ 300e-3, -4, and the 20% reserve for nonmetropolitan HMOs, id. §§
300e-2(i), -3(k), -4(e), also help establish this priority.
391. Id. § 300e-8. A total of $250,000,000 was authorized for grants for the 4 years ending
June 30, 1977, and $75,000,000 was authorized to be appropriated to the loan fund.
392. SENATE HMO REPORT 11, supra note 269, at 10-11.
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that would be corrected by the 1976 HMO Amendments.3 Other
problems lie with HEW's failures to implement the funding priori-
ties for rural and medically underserved areas," 4 to establish the
loan guarantee program,395 and to spend even available appropria-
tions.39 One cause of these failures is believed to be inadequate
administration of the program by HEW,39' and the Senate's version
of the 1976 HMO Amendments would require HEW to administer
the Federal HMO Act "through a single identifiable administrative
unit."' Another important cause undoubtedly is the Act's rather
stiff qualifying conditions that have discouraged HMOs from seek-
ing the financial and other benefits provided by the Act.399
(5) Overall Assessment and Recommendations
The main value of the Federal HMO Act may lie with the fact
that it represents a commitment of the federal government to reform
health care by promoting HMOs, an essentially nonregulatory ap-
proach that seems to have substantial merit. Although the Act is too
restrictive and incomplete in many respects, its restrictive nature
may be fortuitous. Given the current anti-regulation mood that is
abroad, it may be much easier to repeal overly restrictive provisions
than to add desired regulations to an overly liberal statute.1°° In this
vein the federal government's commitment to reforming health care
through HMO development could be strengthened by three sets of
amendments to the Federal HMO Act.
First, the Act or its regulations should be amended to ensure
that the three specific reforms suggested by the limited reformmon-
gering theory are implemented by all qualified HMOs. HMOs' basic
policies should be required to include the full range of preventive
maternity and well-child care and all related drug costs. The former
393. CONFERENCE REPORT, supra note 235, at 5-6, §§ 108(a)-(c).
394. SENATE HMO REPORT II, supra note 269, at 5.
395. Id. at 10.
396. In fiscal year 1975, HEW left unspent about half of its $45,000,000 appropriation.
N.Y. Times, Nov. 22, 1975, at 17, col. 2. Indeed, throughout the first two and a half years of
the Act's brief life, through fiscal year 1976, HEW has made 160 grants totalling only
$31,400,000. Kirsch, interview, supra note 252. These facts may help explain why the Ford
Administration recommended an appropriation for 1976-77 of only $18,000,000, N.Y. Times,
Nov. 22, 1975, at 17, col. 2, approximately 21% of the $85,000,000 authorized for 1976-77 by
the Act. 42 U.S.C. § 300e-8(a) (Supp. V, 1975).
397. SENATE HMO REPORT II, supra note 269, at 4-5, 10-11; see note 396 supra.
398. CONFERENCE REPORT, supra note 235, at 11, § 116.
399. See text accompanying notes 254-329 supra.
400. The liberalizing nature of the 1976 HMO Amendments is some evidence of this
proposition.
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change probably could be implemented by regulation, in view of the
Act's open-ended definition of preventive services that must be in-
cluded in an HMO's basic policy." ' Also, the Act or its regulations
should be amended to promote the maximum feasible expanded
medical delegation by HMOs by requiring progress reports and pro-
fessional and consumer education related to this goal."'
Secondly, the Federal HMO Act should be amended in six ways
to allow nonmodel as well as model HMOs to qualify for the Act's
benefits, at least the market access and preemption benefits."3 Re-
quired insurance coverage should be reduced to basic inpatient and
outpatient services (including, however, full coverage of all related
maternity care and drugs)."' The three requirements of consumer
participation in HMO governance, community rating, and open
enrollments should be eliminated. An administrative waiver of the
seventy-five percent limit on membership from nonrural medically
underserved populations should be provided for HMOs that can
show such a requirement to be unrealistic, and the full assumption
of risk requirement should be eliminated.
Thirdly, the Act's preemption and market access benefits
should be expanded in several ways. Preemption benefits should be
expanded to cover all HMO advertising and expanded medical dele-
gation by HMOs,"' and qualified HMOs should be exempted from
PSRO monitoring and certificate-of-need regulation. Finally, in
view of the states' general unwillingness to mandate an HMO option
401. 42 U.S.C. § 300e-1(1)(H) (Supp. V, 1975). The 1976 HMO Amendments would add
well-child care to the Act's definition of basic services. CONFEREN E REPORT, supra note 235,
at 3, § 104(a)(1); SENATE HMO REPORT II, supra note 269, at 39.
402. The Act's broad authority for HEW to do this by regulation is discussed in the
text accompanying notes 325-29 supra.
403. Although we recommend that nonmodel HMOs be allowed to qualify for develop-
mental subsidies as well, it might be politically advantageous to limit developmental subsi-
dies to experiments with model HMOs. Cf. text accompanying notes 184-86 supra.
404. The remaining requirement that HMOs cover basic inpatient and outpatient serv-
ices would preclude qualification of specialty HMOs, such as those covering only surgical,
dental, or drug services. Lack of experience with these types of HMOs and a variety of
theoretical reasons (for example, the danger of underservice if only surgical care and not
general medical care were covered by prepayment) justify this exclusion, although the Act
might be amended to authorize HEW to fund experimental projects with specialty HMOs.
See HousE UNNECESSARY SURGERY REPORT, supra note 72, at 6-7 (recommending that HEW
undertake a comprehensive study and fund demonstration projects involving prepaid surgical
care); Schoen, Dental Care and the Health Maintenance Organization Concept, 53 MILBANK
MEM. FUND Q. 173 (1975) (recommending that dental HMOs be promoted).
405. Even with the addition of these preemption provisions to the Act, states would
remain free to regulate HMOs concerning financial soundness, marketing practices, and
quality of care (which might include, if desired, a mandate of consumer participation in HMO
governance as a quality of care control).
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as part of health benefits plans offered to state and local government
employees,"' it seems reasonable for the federal government to at-
tempt to impose the HMO option on state and local government
employers, as would the 1976 HMO Amendments, notwithstanding
the possible constitutional attack on such a provision under
National League of Cities.
B. Medicare, Medicaid, and HMOs
The Medicare and Medicaid programs together provide pub-
licly financed health care benefits for approximately twenty percent
of America's population" ' at an annual public cost in excess of 28
billion dollars."' These programs clearly are a potentially rich
source for funding HMO operations, and any effective legislative
strategy to promote HMOs should consider the relationship between
these programs and HMOs."' In 1972 the federal government en-
acted the Medicare4 10 and Medicaid41' HMO provisions to obtain
greater participation by HMOs in these programs on a prepaid
basis. The 1976 HMO Amendments would amend these provisions
to require in essence that an HMO qualify under the Federal HMO
Act as a condition to participation in these programs on a prepaid
basis. " '
This legislative effort has been marred generally by two unfor-
tunate circumstances. The first is the inevitable conflict between
the short-run goal of government to limit public expenditures and
the long-run goal of improving efficiency in the health care system
by promoting HMO development.113 The second has been the
406. See note 242 supra.
407. See RESOURCE BOOK, supra note 131, at 429, 491.
408. In fiscal year 1975, federal Medicare expenditures were 14.8 billion dollars,
Hearings on President's Medicare Proposals Before the Subcomm. on Health of the House
Comm. on Ways and Means, 94th Cong., 2d Sess. 175 (1976) (statement of David Mathews,
Secretary of HEW, and in calendar year 1975 total public expenditures under Medicaid
exceeded 14 billion dollars. U.S. DEP'T OF HEALTH, EDUCATION, AND WELFARE, SOCIAL AND
REHABILITATION SERVICES, MEDICAL ASSISTANCE (MEDICAID) FINANCED UNDER TITLE XIX OF THE
SOCIAL SECURITY ACT 39 (1976).
409. For an earlier analysis of this relationship primarily from the point of view of
Medicare and Medicaid beneficiaries see Schneider & Stern, supra note 13, at 111-22.
410. 42 U.S.C. § 1395mm (Supp. V, 1975).
411. Id. § 1396a(a)(23) (Supp. V, 1975).
412. CONFERENCE REPORT, supra note 235, at 13 & 14, §§ 201(a) & 202(a).
413. A major practical problem that HMO strategists encounter is that the Medicare
and Medicaid laws, because they are primarily viewed as financing laws, are controlled in
Congress by the finance rather than health committees. The former can be expected to place
much greater emphasis on legislation that limits government payments in the immediate
future, see Havighurst & Blumstein, supra note 38, at 38, even though such limits may not
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influence of the quality utopians' approach to HMOs, which has
resulted in the establishment of overly restrictive conditions for
HMO participation in the two programs. As a consequence of these
problems, few HMOs have indicated an interest in Medicare pre-
payment contracts."4 Under the more flexible Medicaid scheme,
about a quarter of the states have initiated prepayment contracts
with HMOs, but most of this contracting has been in California. ' 5
It does not appear that the full potential of the Medicare and Medi-
caid programs for promoting HMO development has been real-
ized." '
(1) The Medicare HMO Provision
This law establishes a detailed scheme for HMO participation
on a prepaid basis that in certain respects is like that of the Federal
HMO Act. There are at least three significant qualifying conditions,
and the 1976 HMO Amendments would add two more. First, to be
eligible for a prepayment contract, an HMO must provide Medicare
subscribers with all Medicare services provided generally in the
area.' These include posthospital extended care in a skilled nursing
facility for up to one hundred days in a benefit period. 18 An appar-
promote overall efficiency in the health care system. A similar problem exists at the state
level with respect to legislative attempts to amend state Medicaid laws.
414. See McNeil & Schlenker, supra note 9, at 211-13. As of July 1976, only two HMOs
had qualified for prepayment contracts under the Medicare HMO provision, and about 20
had applications pending. Telephone interview with Wayne Fowler, Director, Group Health
Plan Operations, Social Security Administration, HEW, July 22, 1976.
415. At the end of 1974, between 300,000 and 400,000 Medicaid eligibles were enrolled
in 74 HMOs in 13 states and the District of Columbia. Schneider & Stern, supra note 13, at
120 n.149. Fifty-four of these HMOs, with a total Medicaid enrollment in excess of 250,000,
were in California. Id. at 128-29. In July 1976, however, the total number of Medicaid eligibles
enrolled in HMOs had probably declined from its peak because of the failure of about 20
HMOs in California. Telephone interview with H.R. Jolley, Director, Office of Program
Innovation, Social and Rehabilitation Service, HEW, July 22, 1976.
416. By the end of 1974, when Medicaid enrollment had reached its peak, Medicare and
Medicaid beneficiaries had, quite recently, come to constitute a notable proportion of HMOs'
total enrollment (about 15%), although they were served by a relatively few HMOs.
Havighurst & Bovbjerg, supra note 13, at 383 n.9. Since that time this percentage may have
declined substantially in view of HMOs' rapidly expanding enrollments, see notes 8-9 supra
and accompanying text, and the apparently declining Medicaid enrollment in California.
Moreover, it is not clear that all Medicare and Medicaid HMO care is prepaid. McNeil &
Schlenker, supra note 9, at 213. Adequate cost reimbursement of HMO services to Medicare
and Medicaid beneficiaries can also support HMO development, but this payment method
eliminates the HMO's incentive to economize and the chance of the HMO to generate cost
savings that can be attractive to both HMO investors and subscribers. See text accompanying
notes 429-36 infra.
417. 42 U.S.C. § 1395mm(b)(2) (Supp. V, 1975).
418. 42 U.S.C. § 1395d(a)(2) (1970).
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ent problem with this requirement is that the risk of insuring nurs-
ing home services may be extremely high"' and that provision of
such coverage and services also may be beyond the general compe-
tence of many HMOs.
Secondly, fifty percent or more of the HMO's enrollment must
consist of individuals under age sixty-five42 at least after the first
three years of a prepayment contract.4"' HEW's regulations add the
additional requirement that fifty percent or more of the HMO's
enrollment must consist of individuals who are not covered by either
Medicare or Medicaid.4"' These limitations clearly are designed to
eliminate "poor peoples'" HMOs and the risk of underservice to a
captive population, but the statute's failure to provide for adminis-
trative waiver of such limitations in special circumstances may
mean that some Medicare beneficiaries are denied unfairly the op-
portunity to obtain HMO services.2 3
Thirdly, the HMO must conduct annual open enrollments dur-
ing which it accepts Medicare beneficiaries as subscribers "without
restriction, except as may be authorized in regulations," although
open enrollments may be terminated if they would result in an
HMO population that exceeds capacity, violates the fifty percent
limitation on enrollees sixty-five or older, or makes the population
"substantially nonrepresentative" of the area's general population
as determined by regulations.2 4 HEW's regulations on open enroll-
ments merely restate the statutory terms and do not provide any
further definition or limitation of this obligation.2 ' Some form of
open enrollment obligation for HMOs that obtain Medicare benefi-
ciaries as subscribers seems appropriate. As a matter of fairness,
419. For example, the Federal HMO Act merely requires qualified HMOs to offer nurs-
ing home services as supplemental services, 42 U.S.C. § 300e-1(2)(A) (Supp. V, 1975), which
may be offered to subscribers on a fee-for-service basis, id. § 300e(b)(2).
420. Id. § 1395mm(b)(7).
421. Id. § 1395mm(h) provides that HEW may waive the requirement of 50% member-
ship under 65 for the first 3 years of an HMO's prepayment contract if the HMO is "making
continuous efforts and progress toward achieving compliance . . . within such three-year
period."
422. 20 C.F.R. § 405.2004(c)(2) (1976).
423. See text accompanying notes 216-17 supra. Curiously, HEW's regulations do pro-
vide for a waiver of the requirement that 50% of the HMO's membership be under 65, if the
requirement would make the HMO's population "substantially nonrepresentative" of the
general population in the HMO's area. 20 C.F.R. § 405.2004(c)(1)(i) (1976). Although the
statute does express concern about an HMO's having to take a higher proportion of Medicare
beneficiaries than live in the general population, 42 U.S.C. § 1395mm(b)(9) (Supp. V, 1975),
it does not appear to authorize a regulation that would allow HMOs to have more than 50%
Medicare enrollments when more than 50% of the general population is over 65.
424. 42 U.S.C. § 1395mm(b)(9) (Supp. V, 1975).
425. 20 C.F.R. § 405.2004(d) (1976).
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Medicare beneficiaries residing in the HMO's area should be treated
as a group and the HMO should not be allowed to select only low-
risk individuals.42 The current statutory provisions, however, do not
provide an HMO with maximum flexibility to negotiate with the
Social Security Administration concerning the total number of
Medicare beneficiaries it will accept on a prepaid basis. Although
an HMO can negotiate for a prepayment contract with the knowl-
edge that it need take Medicare beneficiaries only up to the various
limits noted above, the potential enrollment of Medicare beneficiar-
ies during open enrollment periods may be deemed too large or, if
the HMO's existing membership is not stable, too uncertain. In this
respect the open enrollment requirement of the Medicare HMO
provision seems overly restrictive and likely to retard HMO partici-
pation in Medicare on a prepaid basis. Finally, the 1976 HMO
Amendments would require that Medicare HMOs qualify under the
Federal HMO Act, except that the basic health service coverage for
Medicare beneficiaries would remain as stated above.2 ' This would
mean that Medicare HMOs must provide quite comprehensive in-
surance coverage and community rating for their other enrollees,
include subscribers on their governing boards, and assume almost
all financial risk of coverage for other enrollees. These conditions are
subject to the objections raised above about the Federal HMO
Act. 28
The most significant problem with the Medicare HMO
provision is that it severely limits the incentive and ability of quali-
fied HMOs to generate cost savings by efficient performance under
a prepayment contract and to use these savings for development
purposes.4 29 Only HMOs of a certain size and experience may
participate on a risk-sharing basis that allows the possibility of
retained cost savings, and these HMOs are allowed to retain only
some savings. An urban HMO may participate on a risk-sharing
basis only if it has a current membership of 25,000 members and has
served at least 8,000 persons in the preceding two years; a nonurban
HMO may o participate if it has 5,000 members and has served at
least 1,500 persons in the last three years.43 ° If these HMOs also can
426. This claim may appear inconsistent with our objection to the open enrollment
provision of the Federal HMO Act. See text accompanying notes 304-06 supra. Medicare
beneficiaries, however, unlike the general population, are a distinct group since they all pay
the same premiums to the Medicare program and are entitled to similar benefits. This
substantially strengthens the claim for fairness in this situation.
427. CONFERENCE REPORT, supra note 235, at 13-14, § 201(a).
428. See text accompanying notes 254-79, 295-306 & 317-24 supra.
429. See McNeil & Schlenker, supra note 9, at 211-13.
430. 42 U.S.C. § 1395mm(i)(2)(A) (Supp. V, 1975). The requirement that urban HMOs
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satisfy HEW that they have the capacity to bear the risk of potential
losses,43 1 they may contract on a risk-sharing basis. Under risk-
sharing contracts, cost savings are to be measured annually on a
retroactive basis by comparing the HMO's actual costs of serving
Medicare beneficiaries with an estimate of what Medicare would
have paid out if the beneficiaries had been served by other provi-
ders.132 This provision by itself seems generous enough, although it
will involve far greater administrative costs and more uncertainty
for the HMO than if a flat per capita payment were made in ad-
vance. More importantly, an HMO with a risk-sharing prepayment
contract may retain only one half of any cost savings, up to a maxi-
mum retained amount of ten percent of the estimated cost of service
by other providers, 33 and the HMO is required to absorb all losses
except for fifty percent of any losses that can be offset against future
savings. 3 14 All other qualified HMOs may obtain prepayment con-
tracts, but the prepaid amounts are subject to retroactive adjust-
ment on a reasonable cost basis.4 35 These HMOs may benefit from
improved cash flow generated by advance payment of Medicare
funds,4 3 but they will not have any incentive to economize on these
services nor will they be able to retain cost savings that can be used
to attract investors and, by offering extra services and lower copay-
ments, to attract subscribers.
The Medicare HMO provision's limitations on risk sharing and
retained cost savings hardly seem designed to promote HMO devel-
opment by attracting large numbers of HMOs to prepayment par-
ticipation in Medicare. Only some HMOs may qualify for risk shar-
ing, the administrative costs will be substantial, and the risks of
gain will not balance the risks of loss. These limitations have been
must have a membership of 25,000 or more in order to participate on a risk sharing basis,
though inconsistent with the allowance of much smaller rural HMOs to so participate, appar-
ently was intended to protect Medicare program and beneficiaries from smaller HMOs be-
coming insolvent under a risk sharing contract. See S. REP. No. 1230, 92d Cong., 2d Sess.
231-32 (1972) (explaining this requirement as necessary to determine valid HMO prepayment
rates). In 1972 it was commonly believed that HMOs needed enrollments of 20,000 or more
to be economically feasible, but it now appears that much smaller HMOs with enrollments
of 5,000 are generally feasible. See note 61 supra. Another explanation for imposition of the
size requirement on risk sharing HMOs might have been the belief that these HMOs will
generate larger cost savings for the government by reason of economies of scale. We have
noted above that this belief is not yet well documented. See text accompanying notes 60-66
supra.
431. 42 U.S.C. § 1395mm(i)(2)(B) (Supp. V, 1975).
432. Id. §§ 1395mm(a)(3)(A)(i), (iv).
433. Id. § 1395mm(a)(3)(A)(i).
434. Id. § 1395mm(a)(3)(A)(ii).
435. Id. §§ 1395mm(a)(3)(B), (i)(2)(B).
436. See Schneider & Stern, supra note 13, at 118-19.
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designed primarily to obtain immediate savings in public expendi-
tures,4 3 but the limitations and the qualifying conditions noted
above apparently have failed even to implement this goal. 3 This
approach seems self-defeating and in any event too short-sighted to
constitute an appropriate policy toward HMOs.
(2) The Medicaid HMO Provision
This provision simply authorizes states to enter into prepay-
ment contracts with HMOs for Medicaid beneficiaries.4 39 HEW's
regulations under this provision44 follow the pattern of the Medicare
HMO provision, but in a less restrictive form that leaves state agen-
cies with considerable discretion to implement HMO contracts.
This latitude is consistent with both the simple nature of the Medi-
caid HMO provision and the Medicaid law's general structure,
which gives broad discretion to states to formulate and administer
their Medicaid plans.44'
Under these regulations a qualified HMO must provide a "com-
prehensive" range of services, but these need include only hospital
inpatient, outpatient, physician, laboratory, and X-ray services.442
The HMO may not have more than fifty percent of its members
covered by Medicare or Medicaid, but this requirement may be
waived by HEW for "good cause. 443 Open enrollments for Medicaid
beneficiaries must be provided, but the HMO and state Medicaid
agency may set limits on such enrollment by contract.44 A qualified
HMO need assume only a "substantial portion of the risk" of its
coverage of Medicaid beneficiaries.4 Finally, the prepayment con-
tract must "specify how any 'savings' (excess of premiums over
allowable costs) will be apportioned between the [HMO] and the
state agency,""44 an apparent requirement that Medicaid HMO con-
tracts must provide for at least some government sharing in cost
savings.
437. See S. REP. No. 1230, 92d Cong., 2d Sess. 229-32 (1972).
438. See text accompanying note 414 supra.
439. 42 U.S.C. § 1396a(a)(23) (Supp. V, 1975). Prior to enactment of this section,
uncertainty about the authority of state Medicaid agencies to contract with HMOs existed
because of the Medicaid law's provisions that Medicaid services be provided on a uniform
basis throughout the state. Id. §§ 1396(a)(1), (10) (1970).
440. 45 C.F.R. § 249.82 (1975).
441. See generally Butler, The Medicaid Program: Current Statutory Requirements
and Judicial Interpretations, 8 CLEARINGHOUSE REV. 7 (1974).
442. 45 C.F.R. § 249.82(b)(10)(ii) (1975).
443. Id. § 249.82(c)(5)(ii).
444. Id. § 249.82(c)(5)(i).
445. Id. § 249.82(c)(2)(vi).
446. Id. § 249.82(c)(2)(v).
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These regulations permit state Medicaid agencies to define
qualified HMOs in a manner that is substantially in accord with our
recommended changes in the Federal HMO Act's qualifying condi-
tions.447 They also appear to permit prepaid risk-sharing contracts
with HMOs that meet most of our objections to the Medicare HMO
provision." 8 Nonetheless, the regulations do not require state Medi-
caid agencies to contract in this fashion, nor do they require that
Medicaid HMOs provide full drug and maternity care or make max-
imum feasible use of expanded medical delegation. Thus what
states actually do under these guidelines is a wide open question and
great variety in HMO contracting may be expected.44 '
Finally, the 1976 HMO Amendments would require Medicaid
HMOs, like Medicare HMOs, to satisfy the qualifying conditions of
the Federal HMO Act except the one concerning coverage of basic
services.45 This would mean that Medicaid HMOs must provide
quite comprehensive coverage and community rating for their other
enrollees, include subscribers on their governing boards, and as-
sume almost all financial risk of coverage for other enrollees. The
1976 HMO Amendments also would require Medicaid HMOs to add
family planning and home health care services to their basic policy
for Medicaid beneficiaries. 5 ' The addition of family planning serv-
ices to the basic policy is consistent with our recommendations for
the requirement of a full range of maternity care. On the other hand,
the requirement that home health care services be offered is not
consistent with our theory and might impose unwarranted costs.452
(3) Overall Assessment and Recommendations
Federal legislative efforts to engage the HMO movement in
serving Medicare and Medicaid beneficiaries seem but halting first
steps towards effective promotion of HMOs as a more efficient form
of health care. The Medicare HMO provision suffers from its exces-
sive emphasis on the short-term goal of reducing public expendi-
tures by use of HMOs, a goal which appears to be self-defeating.
The Medicaid HMO provision is more liberal in what it allows
states to do, but one can expect that many state Medicaid agencies
also will emphasize saving public expenditures by limiting HMOs'
447. See text accompanying notes 403 & 404 supra.
448. See text accompanying notes 429-38 supra.
449. See McNeil & Schlenker, supra note 9, at 210.
450. CONFERENCE REPORT, supra note 235, at 14-17, § 202(a).
451. Id.
452. Cf. text accompanying notes 417-19 supra.
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ability to retain cost savings. These laws do not seem well designed
to attract HMOs to participate in the Medicare and Medicaid pro-
grams on a prepaid basis. Furthermore, the additional restriction to
be imposed by the 1976 HMO Amendments will make this process
an even more difficult one.
We recommend that the Medicare and Medicaid HMO
provisions be amended in three basic ways. First, HMOs should be
able to qualify for prepaid risk-sharing contracts under qualifying
conditions similar to those we have recommended for the Federal
HMO Act. Under these conditions HMOs would be required to offer
only basic inpatient and outpatient services, although these should
include all related drug services that are paid for by Medicare45 or
Medicaid45 ' and a full range of maternity and well-child care for
Medicaid enrollees. These HMOs also should be required to make
maximum feasible use of expanded medical delegation.
Secondly, the size limitation for risk-sharing participation by
urban HMOs under Medicare should be reduced substantially in
order to recognize the financial viability of smaller HMOs and the
particular benefits they may provide. Thirdly, these amendments
also should ensure that HMOs are paid a flat premium in advance,
with HMOs bearing the full risk of any losses and able to retain all
cost savings. The determination of appropriate premium amounts
is admittedly a difficult issue if it is deemed desirable to provide in
HMO contracts for some immediate savings in public expenditures.
If establishing HMO premiums at amounts equivalent to what it
costs to pay other providers for services to similar beneficiary groups
is not desirable, the best approach to this issue is the one recom-
mended by the fair market theorists.55 HMOs should be paid
premiums for Medicare and Medicaid services that are equivalent
to the market-established premiums they charge other enrollees,
with adjustments to the extent that different services are provided
to different groups. This formula would not work, however, for
HMOs that obtain waivers of the fifty percent limit on Medicare
and Medicaid beneficiaries and primarily serve these persons. In
453. Very few outpatient drugs are covered by Medicare. Such coverage is limited
essentially to drugs commonly furnished in physicians' offices, 42 U.S.C. § 1395x(s)(2)(A)
(1970), and those that cannot be self-administered and are furnished at a hospital. Id. §
1395x(s)(2)(B).
454. The Medicaid law authorizes states to cover outpatient as well as inpatient drugs,
see 42 U.S.C. § 1396d(a)(12) (1970), and today most state plans provide at least some cover-
age of outpatient prescription drugs. See U.S. DEP'T OF HEALTH, EDUCATION, AND WELFARE,
SOCIAL AND REHABILITATION SERVICES, MEDICAL ASSISTANCE (MEDICAID) FINANCED UNDER TITLE
XIX OF THE SOCIAL SECURITY ACT 43 (1976).
455. See text accompanying notes 213-17 supra.
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this situation, a proposal that seems fair to HMOs, Medicare and
Medicaid beneficiaries, and the public fisc would be to allow Medi-
care and Medicaid agencies to negotiate "reasonable" premiums
with these HMOs that are between ninety-five and one hundred
percent of the amount that otherwise would be paid to fee-for-
service providers for such services. 56
This recommended expansion of the Medicare and Medicaid
HMO programs should provide substantial benefits to all concerned
parties. Nonmodel as well as model HMOs would improve their
access to a relatively large consumer market. Medicare and Medi-
caid beneficiaries, as HMO subscribers, would benefit from any
quality of care improvements offered by HMOs, from additional
services that may be offered by HMOs to obtain their enrollment,
and, in the case of Medicare beneficiaries not also covered by Medi-
caid,45' from reduced deductibles and coinsurance payments that
also may be offered by HMOs to obtain their enrollment."8 Govern-
ment and taxpayer-consumers might benefit from some immediate
savings in public expenditures, which may accrue from reduced
administrative costs459 as well as lower payments to HMOs. In the
long run these parties also would obtain the benefits of lower costs
and improved quality in the health care system generally that may
be expected from substantial HMO expansion.
V. CONCLUSION
In this article we have tried to develop and apply a new theory
of HMO legislation, one which borrows from and to some extent
synthesizes earlier approaches. Our theory focuses on encouraging
HMO development through the play of market forces and, at the
same time, on using the HMO as a policy instrument for effecting
certain specific health care reforms on a general basis that may not
otherwise be obtained. The essential advantage of this theory, we
believe, is that it provides better recognition than other theories
have of the combined economic and political possibilities of HMOs.
456. The House of Representatives initially proposed a Medicare HMO provision that
would have authorized all HMO premiums to be set at an amount equal to 95% of the amount
that otherwise would be paid to other providers, S. REP. No. 1230, 93d Cong., 2d Sess. 230
(1972), which guarantees a 5% savings in government expenditures. We recommend a more
flexible provision in order to encourage newer and smaller HMOs to participate in Medicare
and Medicaid on a prepaid basis. This seems desirable for reasons given in the text
accompanying notes 206-08 supra.
457. The Medicaid statute requires states to pay Medicare deductibles and coinsurance
for certain categories of Medicaid recipients who are also eligible for Medicare. 42 U.S.C. §§
1396b(b)(1), 1396a(a)(10)(c)(II), 1396a(a)(15) (Supp. V, 1975).
458. For discussion of the generally steep copayment requirements under Medicare see
Schneider & Stern, supra note 13, at 113-14.
459. Id. at 134.
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